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1.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
1.  The  Monetary  Committee's  previous  examination  of  the  economic 
situation  In  the  Netherlands  took  place  In  March  1985  when  the 
Committee  commented  on  the  I  nit Ia I  results  of  an  economic  policy 
which  had  been  launched  several  years  ear ller  against  an 
International  economic  background  which  was  particularly 
unfavourable.  Since  then,  the  Improvements  noted  on  that  occasion 
(low  Inflation  rate,  wage  moderation,  recovery  of  profits,  revival 
of  Investment,  reduction  of  the  budget  deficit,  limiting  of  public 
sector expenditure ...  )  have  generally gone  further,  and  progress  has 
been  made  In  other  areas  (employment  creation,  fall  In  the 
unemployment  rate ...  ).  These  further  Improvements  have  occurred 
despite  the  reverse oil  shock  of  1986,  the effects of which  were  not 
entirely  favourable,  unlIke  the  situation  In  most  of  the  other 
Member  States. 
2.  The  recovery  of  the  Dutch  economy  since  the  early  1980s  Is 
remarkable  both  because  of  Its  scale,  starting  as  It  did  from  a 
situation  which  was  particularly  unbalanced  from  many  points  of 
view,  and  because  It  marks  a  break  with  earlier  decades  In  that  It 
represents  a  complete  change  of  economic  pol Icy,  allied  with 
profoundly different  behaviour  on  the  labour  market. 
From  the  late  1970s,  the  Government  had  expll~ltly  chosen  a 
medium-term  growth  and  employment  strategy,  endeavouring  to  correct 
the  structura I  I  mba I  ances  whIch  had  developed  and  bu II t  up  In  the 
preceding decades;  their most  obvious  sy~ptoms were: 
-the  Increase  In  the  public  sector's share  of  the  economy  and  the 
fact  that  public  expenditure  was  Increasingly  difficult  to 
control,  especially subsidies and  social  benefits; 
\ 
-serious dlstorslons  In  relative factor  prices; 
\  -the deterioration  In  the  profitability  of  fixed  capital  and  the 
fall  In  the  Investment  ratio; 
- employment  problems  exacerbated by  demographic  changes. -2-
The  conditions  for  recovery  have  gradually been  establ lshed  by: 
- an  Incomes  pol Icy  the main  thrust of which  was  to curb  nominal  and 
real  wages  with  the  object  of  contributing  to  an  Improvement  In 
the  employment  situation  by  Improving  the  level  of  cost 
competitiveness and  restoring company  profltabl I lty; 
- a  budgetary  policy  aimed  at  reducing  the  deficit  and  helping  to 
revitalize  the  private  sector  by  limiting  expenditure  and 
stabilizing or  even  cutting  the  burden  of  taxation  and  paraflscal 
charges; 
-a  monetary  policy  aimed  at  price  stabl I lty  and  Increasingly 
Influenced  by  the objective of  maintaining  a  stable exchange  rate 
against  the German  mark. 
3.  In  adopting  these  pol lcles,  the  Netherlands  was  In  the  forefront  In 
reinvigorating  supply  conditions.  The  policies  have  remained 
broadly  the  same  since  1982.  In  addition,  greater  attention  has 
been  paid  to  the  distorting  effects  of  a  number  of  rigidities 
connected  with  the  tax  and  paraflscal  system,  which  affect  cost 
formation  In  the economy  and  supply  and  demand  on  the  labour  market. 
The  structure  of  the  pub I I  c  budget  has  a I  so  been  reformed  through . 
measures  designed  to  simplify  the  fiscal  system  of  revenue  and 
expenditure. 
4.  All  the  changes  made  created  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  Dutch 
economy  to benefit  from  the  Improvement  In  the  European  environment. 
From  1984,  economic  growth  returned  to  a  more  sustained  rate, 
averaging  2.7 X  a  year  since  then  In  GOP  terms,  compared  with  an 
average  growth  rate  of  3X  for  the  Community  as  a  whole.  For 
enterprises  alone  and  excluding  the  energy  sector- where  value 
added  has  remained  virtually  static  In  recent  years- growth  has 
averaged  3.2 X a  year. 
Growth  was  largely  led  by  Investment,  and  more  recently  by  private 
consumption,  and  has  helped  to  reduce  the  current  account  surplus 
from  4 X of  GOP  In  1985  to some  3 X at  present. 
The  Inflation  rate  has  averaged  only  1 X a  year.  Since  1983  It  has 
been  the  lowest  rate  In  the  CommunIty  and  In  the  IndustrIa II zed 
world. 
5.  Employment  has  Increased  steadily  since  1985,  at  between  1 X  and 
1.5 X  a  year,  and  the  unemployment  rate  has  fallen.  The  priority 
given  to  job  creation rather  than  to wage  Increases,  and  the greater 
flexlbl llty  In  working  contracts  have  had  positive  results  and  have 
resulted  In  an  Improvement  In  the  labour  market  situation. -3-
However,  although  International  comparisons  are  particularly 
difficult  In  the  case  of  the  Netherlands,  the  unemployment  rate  Is 
still  relatively  high  (9.3 X of  the  labour  force  In  1989  according 
to  Eurostat  fIgures  as  compared  to  9  X  for  the  CommunIty  average) 
and  Its structural  component  Is  Increasingly  large,  with  problems  of 
mismatch  between  supply  and  demand  and  a  worsening  of  long-term 
unemployment.  Moreover,  thrs  has  prompted  the  authorities  to 
concentrate  their efforts on  training. 
In  addition,  the  number  of  people  receiving  benefits  from  the 
lnval ldlty  scheme  (845  000  at  the  end  of  1989)  and  the  steady 
Increase  In  this number  suggest  that  the  Improvement  has  not  been  as 
clear  as  that  shown  by  the  traditional  labour  market  Indicators.  A 
revision  of  the  conditions  governing  eligibility  under  the  system, 
possibly  Involving  greater  selectivity  and  the  posslbll lty  of 
employment  In  other  sectors  or  professIons,  has  to  be  envIsaged. 
This  should  make  It  possible  to maintain  a  level  of  social  security 
protection  that  meets  real  needs  without  jeopardizing  the  whole 
soc I  a I  secur I ty  system.  It  wou I  d  a I  so  seem  appropr I  ate  to  draw 
firms'  attention  to  the  costs  Involved  In  the  rising  number  of 
people  benefiting  from  the  Invalidity  scheme.  This  is  currently 
envisaged  by  the authorities. 
6.  The  public  finance  situation  still  gives  budgetary  pol icy  I ittle 
room  for  manoeuvre  and  the  new  programme  drawn  up  for  the  period 
1991-94  falls  to deal  fully with  the  problem  of  the  risk  Inherent  in 
a  high  level  of  debt.  Admittedly,  great  efforts  have  been  made 
since  the  beginning of  the 80s  to  reform expenditure.  More  recently 
they  helped  to  limit  the  adverse effect  of  the  reverse  oi I  shock  on 
the  budget  balance,  and  subsequently,  against  a  favourable  economic 
background,  to  make  It  possible  to  cut  the  deficit  (from  6.5%  of 
GOP  In  1987  to  5.3%  In  1989)  and  to  achieve  a  primary  surplus. 
However,  the  debt  ratio- which  now  stands  at  almost  so%  of 
GOP- Is  continuing  to  Increase.  Whl  le  Its  stabi I lzatlon,  and 
Indeed  Its  reduction,  are  considered  by  the  Dutch  authorities  to  be 
necessary,  this  Is  not  an  explicit  priority  target  of  the  medium-
term  budgetary  programmes. 
In  future,  budgetary  policy  In  the  Netherlands  wll 1  have  to  respond 
to a  number  of difficulties: 
- the  adjustment  effort  necessary  to  halt  the  Increase  In  the 
debt/GOP  ratio wl  I I  have  to be  greater  than  that  envisaged  by  the 
programme  covering  the  period  1991-94,  In  present  conditions 
relating to  Interest  rates and  growth; 
- In  the  shorter  term,  the  attainment  of  budget  objectives  Is 
subject  to  a  number  of  uncertalnt les,  notably  the  evaluat lon  of 
windfall  gains  In  revenue  and  the  consequences  of  restoring  the 
link  between  wages  In  the  publ lc  sector  and  social  security -4-
benefIts  on  the  one  hand  and  prIvate  sector  wages  on  the  other. 
According  to  recent  estimates  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the 
target set  for  1991  could  be  overshot  by  0.6 X of  GOP; 
-after  a  number  of  years  of  budgetary  restriction,  some  reticence 
Is  beginning  to be  shown.  Given  the budgetary  rigidities,  It  wl  II 
probab I  y  be  IncreasIng I  y  d Iff I  cuI t  to  curb  expendIture  wIthout 
modifying  transfer  payment  systems. 
In  the  Nether I  ands,  the  need  for  a  budgetary  adjustment  Is  not 
accompanIed  by  I  mba I  ances  rei a ted  to  the  ba I  ance  of  payments  or 
. Inflation.  There  Is  no  budgetary  crisis anymore.  However  this  has 
brought  about  crowding  out  which  Is  testified  by  the  level  of  real 
Interest  rates.  Efforts  must  be  made,  first,  to  reduce  the 
resources  absorbed  by  the  pub II c  sector  and,  second,  to  ha It  the 
rIse  In  the  debt  rat lo  and  then  to  brIng  It  down,  because  the 
current  path  of  debt  and  deficits  are  not  sustainable  In  the  long 
run. 
7.  The  Nether lands  provl(ile  an  example  of  a  country  where  monetary 
author It les  endeavour  , at  the  same  tIme  to  lnf luence  domest lc 
liquidity  creation  and  to maintain  a  stable  exchange  rate.  Indeed, 
the  objective of  keeping  the guilder's exchange  rate stable against 
the  German  mark  has  become  dominant,  and  the  dlst lnct lon  between 
domestic  and  external  monetary  policy  Is  tending  to  become  blurred. 
However,  the  Dutch  authorities  consider  that  It  Is  necessary  to 
prevent  excessive  liquidity  growth,  which  could  give  r lse  to  a 
flight  of  capital.  The  Instrument  currently  used  Is  based  on  a 
system  of  monetary  cash  reserves  app11ed  by  means  of  agreements 
. concluded  with  the  banking  sector  to  limit  ••net••  domestic  credit 
expansion  (I.e.  expansion  not  financed  by  long-term  resources). 
Similarly,  the  public  sector  has  undertaken  not  to  resort  to 
"monetary  financing"  of  the  deficit- considered  to  be  any  net 
Increase  In  the short-term debt. 
The  usefulness and  effectiveness of  the domestic  Instruments of  this 
pol Icy  are  open  to  question.  A  country  of  the  size  of  the 
Netherlands  which  maintains  a  stable  exchange  rate  against  the 
German  mark  has  I Itt I  e  headroom  for  pursuIng  an  Independent  money 
supply  policy.  Given  the  growing  mobility of  capital  In  Europe  and 
the  assured  credibility of  the  exchange-rate  commitment,  the  degree 
of  substitution  between  domestic  and  external  assets  Is  Increasing 
and  the  Impact  on  monetary  expansion  of  a  limit  on  domestic  credit 
tends  to  be  offset  by  capital  movements.  In  addition,  In 
Increasingly  Integrated  markets  with  growing  possibilities  of 
financial  Innovation,  the  effectiveness  of  limiting  credit  may  be 
limited  not  only  by  recourse  to  the  external  sector  but  also  by  the 
development  of  new  forms  of  non-bank  credit. (2) 
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Recent  events  Illustrate  these  problems.  In  June  1989,  the 
Nederlandsche Bank  concluded  an  agreement  with  the  banks  In  order  to 
limit  credit  expansion  over  the  period  1  July  1989  to  30  June  1990. 
During  the  last  six  months  of  1989,  net  money  creation  by  banks 
actuallY  slowed  down  appreciably- chiefly  because  of  sales  of 
long-term  pub II c  secur 1  t les  by  the  banks  - but  the  contract lonary 
Impact  on  monetary  expansIon  has  been  more  than  compensated  by 
capIta  1  1  nf lows,  I  arge  1  y  due  to  non-res I  dents·  heavy  demand  for 
Netherlands government  bonds. 
In  addition,  the  liquidity  ratio  (as measured  by  the  ratio of  M2  to 
net  national  Income),  the  traditional  target  variable  of  Dutch 
monetary  policy,  has  lost  some  of  Its  value  as  an  Indicator:  during 
the  major  part  of  the  1980s,  monetary  growth  was  very  rapid  (+7.5% 
a  year  on  average)  and  bore  no  relation  to  the  nominal  variables  and 
the  Inflation  rate.  This  has  led  the  monetary  authorities  to 
consider  other  Indicators,  and  In  particular  to  attribute  more 
Importance  to  the analysis of  I lquldlty variations  by  sector. 
a.  Despite  lower  Inflation  than  In  Germany,  and  the  Dutch  authorities' 
continued  commitment  since  1983  to  maintain  a  stable  exchange  rate 
agaInst  the  German  mark,  there  Is  st I II  a  posItIve  Interest-rate 
differential  In  relation  to  German  rates.  In  nominal  terms  it 
persisted,  Indeed  at  a  low  level,  until  last  March.  This  probably 
ref I  ects  the  fact  that  the  markets  cannot  predIct  wIth  comp I  ete 
certainty  the  monetary/exchange-rate  pol Icy  reaction,  beyond  the 
I lfetlme of  the  present  government,  to any  future  need  for  budgetary 
contraction.  In  the  absence  of  any  significant  expectations  of 
rising  Inflation  In  the  Netherlands,  this  means  that  real  Interest 
rates are relatively high.  In  the  case of  the  Netherlands,  It  would 
seem  that  this situation should  be  viewed  particularly  In  the  I lght 
of  the  public-sector  debt  and  deficit  position,  necessitating  a 
further  sustained adjustment  effort  In  the  future. 
9.  The  de  facto  monetary  union  between  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  Is 
relatively  recent  judging  by  the  trend of  the  risk premium  and  stl I I 
shows  an  asymmetry  as  regards expectations:  In  markets'  view,  there 
Is  I Itt le  prospect  of  the  guilder  appreclat lng  against  the  German 
mark.  This  experience  nevertheless  provides  an  example  of  monetary 
~nlon  In  Its main  effects for  monetary  policy. 
/the  nature  of  the  specific  shocks  affecting  the  Dutch  economy  may 
help  to explain this asymmetry. 
Overall,  the  reverse  oil  shock  of  1986-87  did  not  have  the  same 
favourable  effects  on  the  Dutch  economy  as  It  did  on  the  German 
economy.  Given  the  relative  Importance  of  the  energy  production  in 
the  Netherlands,  the  terms  of  trade  gains  were  not  nearly  so  great 
as  for  Germany,  and  the  fal I  In  natural  gas  prices  led  to  a -6-
substantial  loss  of  public  receipts  (4.5% of  GOP  between  1985  and 
1989).  New  budgetary  restrictions  were  adopted  so  as  to  bring  the 
deficit  back  to  a  path  close  to  the  Initial  targets.  Such  a 
conjunction  of  events  called  necessarl ly  for  a  real  depreciation of 
the exchange  rate.  The  pol Icy  of  maintaining a  stable exchange  rate 
In  nominal  terms  against  the  German  mark  was  not  cal led  Into 
question,  but  the  widening  of  the  nominal  Interest-rate differential 
with  German  rates,  In  a  period  of  relative  deflation,  translated 
1  nto  h 1  gh  1  eve 1  s  of  rea 1  1  nterest  rates  In  the  Nether I  ands.  The 
labour  market  was  responsible  for  much  of  the  adjustment.  Increases 
In  both  nomIna I  and  rea I  wages  were  apprec I  ab I  y  sma II er  than  In 
Germany,  and  this permitted competitiveness  to  Improve  vis-a-vis  the 
Federal  Republic  and  limited  the  adverse  effects  on  growth  and 
employment  of  the  budgetary  restrictions  and  of  real  Interest  rates 
however  remaining  high. 
The  situation  with  regard  to  the  publ lc  sector's  deficit  and 
Indebtedness creates another  type  of  asymmetry  between  the  Dutch  and 
German  economies.  The  question  arises  If  the  need  to  carry  out  a 
substantial  budgetary  adjustment  over  a  relatively  long  period  In  a 
system  of  "f 1  xed"  exchange  rates  has  not  InhIbIted  the  economy's 
performance  In  terms  of  growth,  given  that  this situation translates 
Indirectly  Into  high  levels of  real  Interest  rates. 
Wage  moderation  and  changes  In  labour  market  attitudes  and 
structures  seem,  In  this  context,  to  be  essential  preconditions  for 
adjusting  to  various  types  of  shocks  In  a  fixed  exchange-rate 
regime.  It  appears  that  the  Netherlands  could  not  have  adjusted  to 
these  asymmetrical  shocks  while  maintaining  a  fixed  parity  without 
the  Important  changes  In  attitudes  on  the  labour  market  which  had 
taken  place  In  the  first  half of  the  1980s. 
10.  Capital  movements  have  been  totally  liberalized  since  1986. 
Important  developments  have  occurred  on  the  Dutch  financial  markets 
In  recent  years.  Amsterdam  has  long  been  an  Important  continental 
financial  centre,  admittedly  smaller  than  Paris  and  Frankfurt,  but 
offering  a  wide  range  of  products  and  very  active  markets. 
Nevertheless  Amsterdam  has  lost  some  ground,  and  a  large  proportion 
of  transact Ions  In  guilder  bonds  are  carr led  out  on  other  markets 
(nearly  half  In  London).  The  authorities  have  reacted  by  trying  to 
make  Amsterdam  more  attractive,  taking  a  number  of  measures  to ease 
rules  and  regulations  and  to  cut  transaction  costs.  The  banking 
Industry  Is  also  undergoing  major  changes,  which  Include  the 
privatization  of  one  of  the  main  banks  and  the  amalgamation  of  two 
other  leading  Dutch  banks. -7-
2.  GENERAL  ECONOMIC  TRENQ  SINCE  1985  ANP  IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE  COMPLETION 
OF  THE  SINGLE  MARKET 
2.1  Growth  factors 
The  pol Icy  which  has  been  pursued  since  1982  with  a  view  to 
reorganizing  pub! lc  finance,  reducing  the  burden  on  firms  and 
Improving  the  allocation  of  available  manpower  has  had  favourable 
effects  on  economic  growth.  Wage  moderation,  which  was  achieved 
following  a  period of  hefty  wage  Increases  In  the  1970s,  has  led  to 
an  Improvement  In  the  competitiveness  of  Dutch  firms,  which,  as  a 
resu It  have  been  ab I  e  to  take  advantage  of  the  buoyancy  of  wor I  d 
trade and  to step up  Investment. 
Following  a  period of  hesitancy,  the  Improvement  In  the  profits  and 
cash  position  of  firms,  together  with  Increased  competitiveness  and 
a  higher  degree  of  productive  capacity  utilization,  led  to  very 
dynamic  growth  In  private  Investment  by  firms  from  1985  onwards.(1) 
As  a  proportion of  GOP,  Investment  rose  from  18%  In  1983  to  22.5% 
In  1989,  the  corresponding  figures  for  the  Community  being  19.6% 
and  20.6 %.  Against  this,  Investment  by  the  publ lc  authorities 
dipped  slightly  on  account  of  a  restrictive  fiscal  policy.  As  a 
proportion of  GOP,  It  fel I  from  2.6%  In  1985  to 2.3%  In  1989. 
Exports  staged  a  brisk  recovery  In  1983.  Rising  by  an  average  of 
5.4%  a  year  In  the  period  1983-85,  they  made  an  undoubted 
contribution  to  the  Improvement  In  company  profits  and  to  the 
restoration  of  confidence.  This  favourable  development  was 
Interrupted  In  1986  and  1987,  when  Dutch  exporters  had  to  lower 
their  selling prices  In  order  to  limit  the  falls  In  competitiveness 
associated  with  the  gul lders'  appreciation.  AI  1  In  alI,  firms 
Increased  their  market  shares  compared  to  the  situation  at  the 
beginning of  the  1980s. 
(1)  However,  the  annual  rates of  growth  of  Investment  In  equipment  do  not 
reflect  this  basic  trend  because  they  are  considerably  affected  by 
the  I rregu I  ar  purchases  of  means  of  transport  and  by  the  trend  of 
Investment  In  the energy sector  (which  accounts  for  a  high  proportion 
of  the total). -8-
NATURAL  GAS  AND  THE  DUTCH  ECONOMY 
1.  The  Place of  natural  gas  In  the economy 
After  the  discovery  of  natural  gas  In  the  Netherlands  In  1959, 
production  Increased  rapidly.  The  volume  of  sales  reached  a  peak 
In  1976  (with  94.5  bl 11 !on  m3  compared  with  42  bl 11 !on  m3  In 
1970).  Since  then,  sales  volume  has  diminished  appreciably 
(66.4 billion m3  In  1988).  The  two  oil  shocks  had  a  very 
profound  effect  on  the  Dutch  economy,  which  was  dominated  by 
extremely  capital-Intensive  commercial  firms  and  Industries 
consuming  large  amounts  of  energy.  The  rise  In  petroleum  product 
prices  was  very  disadvantageous  for  these  specialized  Industries. 
On  the  other  hand,  State  revenue  Increased,  and  this  facilitated, 
Inter  alIa,  a  pol Icy  of  employment  In  the  pub! lc sector. 
In  1988,  the  production of  natural  gas  In  the  Netherlands  accounted 
for  41  %  of  CommunIty  product !on.  In  the  same  year,  48  X of  the 
country's  consumption  of  energy  was  met  by  natural  gas,  compared 
with  a  figure  of  only  18  X  for  the  Community  as  a  whole.  The 
growth  of  va I  ue  added  (at  constant  pr 1  ces)  In  the  natura I  gas 
sector  has  been  negative  In  some  years,  and  averages  no  more  than 
1 X for  the  years  1985-89.  The  value  added  of  gas  production  now 
represents  some  3  %  of  GOP  compared  to  a  record  7  %  In  1985. 
Employment  In  the  production sector  Increased slightly between  1984 
and  1988,  whereas  It  stab! I !zed  In  the distribution sector. 
At  the  beginning  of  1989  the  reserves  were  estimated  at 
1,730 billion m3,  In  addition  to  discoveries  of  new  deposits;  on 
the  basts  of  1988  production,  for  example,  this  wl  I I  permit 
exploitation  for  more  than  twenty-five  years.  The  pol Icy  of 
restricting  sales  which  was  followed  from  1974  to  1983  has  since 
been  abandoned.  For  small  consumers,  movements  In  petroleum 
product  prices  remain  the  determining  factor  (with  a  delay  of 
between  six  and  nine months  In  adjusting prices),  whl le  for  the  new 
electric  power  stations  It  will  be  possible  to  take  the  price  of 
coal  Into consideration. 
2.  Impact  on  pybl lc  finances 
The  State  levies  taxes on  the profits made  by  the companies  working 
the  gas  fields  and  distributing  gas  and  receives  Indirectly  a 
portion of  the  profits of  the  company  responsible  for  domestic  and 
overseas natural  gas sales  (Gasunle). -9-
After  reaching  a  record  level  of  HFL  24.5 bll I lon  In  1985,  natural 
gas  revenue  fel I  sharply  In  the  following  years,  as a  result of  the 
drop  In  prices.  Natural  gas  revenue  fel I  from  5.9% of  GOP  In  1985 
to 1.3 X In  1989 and  the proportion of  total  State revenue  which  It 
represented  fel I  from  17 X to 4 X over  the  same  period. 
The  medium-term  revenue  forecasts  depend  on  assumptions  concerning 
the  dollar/HFL  exchange  rate,  petroleum  product  prices  and  demand 
on  the  International  market.  The  estimates of  the Central  Planning 
Bureau  for  the  period  1991-94  Indicate  that,  as a  percentage of  net 
national  Income,  non-tax  revenue  wll I  fall  from  1.1%  to  0.9% and 
tax  revenue  wl  II  stabl I lze at 0.5 %.  This would  be  the  result of  a 
very  sl lght  Increase  In  sales volume. 
3.- Importance  of  natyral  gas  for  the cyrrent-accoynt  balance 
Natura I  gas  exp lo I tat I  on  makes  an  Important  contributIon  to  the 
Netherlands'  balance-of-payments  surplus.  A  direct  effect  Is 
produced  by  revenue  from  overseas  natural  gas  sales and  by  smaller 
Imports  of  other  energy  products.  In  1985,  the  year  when  sales 
were  at  their  highest  level,  gas exports  represented 7.7% of  total 
exports  ~~-terms of  value.  In  1989  they  represented  less  than  2  %, 
with  export  prices  having  fallen  by  65  X and  export  volume  by  some 
10.  x,_ 
One  should  also  take  Into  account  the  value  of  energy  products 
which  would  have  been  Imported  had  domestic  natural  gas  not  been 
available.  The  magnitude  of  the  substitution  Is  evident  from  the 
reduction  In  the  Dutch  economy's  dependence  on  Imported  energy, 
which  stood  at  some  21.6 X  In  1988  (52%  In  1970).  Assuming  that 
the  domestic  price  for  natural  gas  Is  the  same  as  the  price 
obtained  for  exports,  the effect of  the substitution of  natural  gas 
for  Imported  energy  may  be  estimated at  HFL  6  bl I I ion  In  1988. 
The  total  direct  effect  on  the  current-account  balance  would 
therefore  be  HFL  10.5 billion,  a  figure  which  should  be  compared 
with  the surplus of  HFL  10.7 bll I lon  recorded  In  1988.(1) 
1985  1989 
Value  added  as X of  GOP  7  3 
Pub I lc  receipts as  % of State revenue  17  4 
as  % of  GOP  5.9  1 0  3 
Exports  as X of  total  exports  7.7  1 .8 
(1)  T~klng  Into  account  the effect  of  the  additional  Income  generated 
by  natural  gas  production  that  Is  spent  on  Imports,  the  positive 
effect  mentioned  Is  appreciably  lower  (according  to  some 
calculation,  It  Is  halved). -10-
However,  wage  moderation,  which  was  conducive  to  Improving  the 
competItIveness  of  the  Dutch  economy,  he I  d  back  the  ex pans I  on  In 
private  consumption,  which  had  been  very  weak  In  the  period  1980-84 
and  by  only  2.5%  a  year  In  the  period  1985-89.  It  Is  only  In  the 
last  few  years  that  personal  disposable  Income  has  grown  more 
rapidly,  particularly  as  a  result  of  tax  concessions.  The  saving 
ratio  has  displayed  a  slight  downward  tendency,  remaining  below  the 
level  recorded  In  1982,  when  private consumption  actually fel I. 
The  upturn  In  domestic  demand  led  to  an  Increase  In  Imports,  which 
grew  by  an  average  of  6% a  year  In  the  period  1985-89,  albeit  with 
fairly wide  fluctuations  from  one  year  to  the  next  due  to del lverles 
of  capital  goods  (aircraft and  ships). 
Overal I,  following  a  deeper  recession  than  In  the  rest  of  the 
Community  at  the  beginning of  the  1980s,  the  Netherlands experienced 
an  upturn  In  growth  from  1984.  GOP  grew  at  an  annual  average  of 
2.5% over  the  period  1985-89,  compared  with  0.6%  In  1980-84.  The 
corresponding  figures  for  the  Community  were  3.0%  and  1.2 %. 
However,  GOP  growth  In  the  Netherlands  has  been  adversely  affected 
by  activity  In  the  energy  sector  (see  box  on  page  3a).  Thus,  value 
added  In  the  company  sector,  excluding  energy,  Increased  by  3.2% a 
year  between  1985  and  1989. 
In  1990,  real  GOP  growth  Is  expected  to  slacken  slightly  compared 
with  the  preceding  year  (3.5% as against  4  %),  a  rate comparable  to 
that  forecast  for  the  Community.  A  contraction  In  aggregate 
Investment,  particularly  In  construction,  wl  I I  probably  be  offset  In 
part  by  a  sustained  Increase  In  private  consumption  attributable  to 
a  reduction  In  the  burden  of  taxation. 
2.2  Labour  market 
After  a  number  of  years  In  which  total  employment  declined,  the 
labour  market  situation began  to  Improve  from  1985.  This  favourable 
trend  has  continued since  then  as  a  result  not  only of  the upturn  In 
activity but  also of  the measures  taken  to  I lmlt  the cost  of  labour, 
notably  wage  moderation  and  the  reduction  In  social  security 
contributions.  The  Increase  In  part-time working  and  the  reduction 
In  the  workIng  week  have  a I  so  he I  ped  to  I  ncr  ease  the  number  of 
people  In  work.  However,  starting  from  a  very  unfavourable 
situat Jon  at  the  beginning  of  the  SO's,  the  Imbalances  are  stIll 
pronounced. 
Between  1985  and  1989,  emp.l oyment  In  the  Net her I  ands  grew  more 
rapidly  than  In  the  Community  as  a  whole.  On  the  basis  of  the 
number  of  per sons  In  emp I  oyment ,  the  I  ncr  ease  was  1 . 5  % to  2 % a 
year  on  average  compared  with  1.2%  for  the  Community.  Most 
activity  branches  recorded  an  Increase  In  employment;  the  Increase -II-
was  part lcular ly  marked  In  the  market  services  sector  and  In  the 
construct I  on  Industry,  whereas  the  rIse  In  manufacturIng  industry 
was  more  lim I ted.  Employment  In  the  energy  sector,  expressed  In 
man-years,  has  barely varied since 1980  despite wide  fluctuations  in 
production  In  this  sector.  Employment  In  the  public  sector  still 
s II ght I  y  I  ncr  eased,  despIte  the  decIsIon  to  reduce  the  number  of 
clvl I  servants. 
In  terms  of  man-years,< 1  >  however,  the  growth  In  emp I  oyment  has 
been  less  rapid  owing  mainly  to  the  Increase  In  part-time  working. 
The  share  taken  by  half-time  working,  which  was  already  high  in 
relation  to  neighbouring  countries,  has  Increased  further.  In 
addition,  the studies carried out  also show  that  flexible  employment 
contracts  and  temporary  jobs  play  a  very  Important  role  In  the 
Netherlands. 
The  labour  force  Is  continuing  to  grow  more  rapidly  than  in  the 
Community  as  a  whole.  This  trend  Is  linked  to  the  growth  in  the 
overal I  population  and  to  the  Increase  In  the  participation rate  for 
women,  which  Is  only  partially  offset  by  a  fall  In  that  for  men. 
However,  the  overal I  activity  rate  Is  lower  than  In  the  other 
countrIes  of  the  CommunIty.  A  fa II  In  the  actIvIty  rate  In  the 
higher-age  categories  Is  attributable  among  other  things  to  the 
pol Icy  pursued  regarding early  retirement  and  Incapacity  for  work. 
AI  I  the  aval lable statistical  series  Indicate  a  fal I  In  unemployment 
over  the  period  1987-89.  On  an  International  comparison,  however, 
the  unemployment  rate  Is  still  very  high.  The  harmonized  Eurostat 
rate  stood  at  9.3 X  In  1989  compared  to  9  X  for  Eur-12(2).  In 
addlt lon,  long-term  unemployment  remains  very  high;  Its  share  In 
total  unemployment  was  about  50%  In  1988  <unemployed  for  more  than 
one  year)  and  the  share  of  very  long-term  unemployment  (over  three 
years)  was  more  than  20%. 
The  labour  market  Is  far  from  being  balanced.  In  particular,  there 
Is  a  growIng  mIsmatch  between  the  job  sk II Is  sought  by  fIrms  and 
those  offered  by  job-seekers.  As  a  result,  shortages  of  certain 
spec I  a I I  st  skI I Is  are  regu I  ar I  y  reported.  In  the  programmes 
designed  to  combat  unemployment,  emphasis  has  been  placed  on 
(1)  See  the  note  concerning  employment  statistics  in  the  statistical 
annex. 
(2)  However,  the  official  unemployment  rate  In  the  Netherlands  Is  6.5% 
of  the  labour  force.  This  figure  Is  derived  from  the  new  method  of 
calculation  which  has  been  applied  since  January  1988  owing  to  the 
errors  detected  In  the  way  In  which  those  registered  as  unemployed 
are  counted.  As  a  result  of  this,  a  comparison  over  time  Is 
difficult.  According  to  the  series  compl led  by  the  Ministry  of 
Social  Affairs,  660,000  people  were  unemployed  In  September  1989 
compared  with  688,000  In  September  1988,  whereas  the series currently 
accepted  as  the  official  Indicator  show  a  figure  of  only  408,000  on 
the  same  date. -12-
MEASURES  TO  PROMOTE  EMPLOYMENT 
A wide  variety of  measures  have  been  taken  In  the  field of  labour 
market  pol Icy.  The  following  are  the most  Important: 
- recruitment  assistance and  grants  for  creating  jobs  for  the 
long-term unemployed  (WVM)  and  for  young  people unemployed  for  two 
years  (JOB)  and  exemptions  from  social-security contributions  for 
employers  who  recruit  the  very  long-term unemployed  (MLW/VM); 
- In-work  training  for  young  unemployed  people  (BVJ), 
work-faml I iarlzatlon programmes  for  young  people  In  the seml-publ lc 
sector  (GWJ/JWG),  and  In-work  training and  recycl lng  (KRS); 
-specific vocational  training,  e.g.  In  computer  technology,  (SI),  or 
the  Improvement  and  updating of  technical  and  administrative 
training  (CVV  and  CAVV)  or  training by  branch  of activity  (BBS); 
- the establishment  of  a  temporary  employment  bureau  (Start)  which 
operates  I Ike  a  private agency  but  provides  jobs  for  people 
unemployed  for  more  than  three months,  for  the older  unemployed  and 
for  the partially handicapped. 
According  to  the Ministry of  Labour,  the estimated number  of  persons 
benefiting  from  alI  these measures  was  150  000  In  1989,  of which 
114  000  received  training. 
\) (3) 
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vocational  training and  on  In-work  training  (see  box  on  page  8).  In 
addition,  a  system  of  grants  and  tax  exemptions  has  been  Introduced 
to encourage  firms  to  take on  the  young  and  long-term  unemployed. 
However,  the  key  element  In  the  strategy  of  combating  unemployment, 
as  conceived  by  the authorities,  has  been  Incomes  pol Icy. 
2.3  Wages.  prices and  competitiveness 
The  agreement  cone 1  uded  bet  ween  emp I  oyer s  and  un Ions  In  1982 ( 1  > 
concerning  wage  policy  has  continued  to  Influence  wage  developments 
throughout  the  1980s.  It  was  designed  to  Increase  employment  by 
re-establishing  economic  growth,  Improving  business  profitability 
and  enhancing  the  distribution  of  the  employment  aval !able.  An 
Important  measure  In  this  respect  was  the  freezing  of  the  minimum 
wage,  which  led  to  the  level  of  numerous  social  transfer  payments 
beIng  frozen.  ThIs  measure,  and  the  government's  w  I thdrawa 1  from 
the  negotiating  committee  and  decentral lzatlon  were  Intended  to 
promote  greater  wage  differentiation.  Since  then,  within 
decentral !zed  wage  negotiations  (being  conducted  at  branch  and 
company  level),  the  creation  of  new  jobs  has  continued  to  be  given 
priority over  wage  Increases.  These  measures  and  agreements,  and  In 
part lcular  the  Importance  attached  by  employers  and  unions  to  the 
need  to preserve  and  Indeed  Improve  the competitiveness of  the  Dutch 
economy,  have  a II  had  a· decIsIve  Impact  on  wage  costs. (2)  The 
reduction  In  employers'  social  security  contributions  In  1989  has 
also  I lmlted  the  rise  In  wage  costs. 
The  Increase  In  nominal  wages  (per  man-year)  has  consequently  been 
very  moderate  In  recent  years  (see  Tab I  e  4):  It  was  1. 5 % a  year 
over  the  period  1985-1989,  as  compared  with  almost  6  %(3)  for  the 
Community  countries as  a  whole.  The  rise was  sl lghtly more  rapid  In 
the  business  sector,  whereas  It  was  restricted  by  the  freezing  of 
wage  scales  In  the publ lc sector. 
In  manufacturing,  If  account  Is  taken  of  productivity  growth,  the 
s I  owdown  In  wages  has  I  ed  to  an  aver age  annua I  r I  se  In  unIt  wage 
costs  of  onlY.  0.7%  (Including  a  fall  In  1988  and  1989)  compared 
(1)  Stlchtlngsakkoord. 
(2)  Recently,  however,  there  have  been  signs  of  upward  pressure  In  the 
negotiations  which  began  In  1990  In  a  number  of  major  sectors. 
However,  the  results announced  In  March  1990  were  moderate. 
(3)  Per  person employed. - 14-
with  a  figure of  2.3% on  average  for  the  narrow-band  ERM-countrles. 
For  the  whole  economy,  excluding  energy,  the  slowdown  of  growth  In 
1986-87  has  led  to  an  Interruption  In  productivity  gains,  followed 
by  a  sharp  rise  In  1988-89. 
Real  wages  (deflated  by  private  consumer  prices)  Increased  by  only 
0.6%  a  year  between  1985  and  1989,  as  compared  with  1.7%  for  the 
Community  as  a  whole. 
The  share  of  wages  and  sa I  ar 1 es  1 n  va 1  ue  added  In  the  bus I  ness 
sector  (excluding  gas)  has  continued  to  fall.(1)  This  fall  was 
more  rapid  In  1988-89,  when  productivity  exceeded  the  rise  In  real 
per  capita  wages.  This  development  Is  an  Indication  that  the  wage 
moderation  pol Icy  has  made  a  major  contribution  to  restoring 
profltabl I tty  and  to  the  Investment  cl lmate. 
The  ana I  ys Is  of  companIes'  resu Its  confIrms  thIs  assessment  (see 
Tab 1  e  8):  the  share  of  wages  In  va I  ue  added  has  dec I I  ned  by  more 
than  10  percentage  points  since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s  and 
allowed  for  a  marked  rise  In  self-financing  capacity.  In  the 
manufacturing  Industry,  profit  rates  have  risen  from  about  5%  at 
the  beginning  of  the  80's  to  somewhat  more  than  12  %  In  1987,  and 
were  probably  higher  in  1988  and  1989.  In  the  services,  results 
have  also  Improved,  starting however  from  a  less unfavourable  level. 
Since  1983,  the  Netherlands  has  recorded  the  lowest  Inflation  rate 
In  the  CommunIty.  The  average  rIse  In  consumer  prIces  was  around 
1 %a year  and,  although  some  acceleration  has  taken  place  In  recent 
months,  the  Increase  anticipated  for  1990  (2.3  %)  wl  I I  probably 
remain  below  the  levels  expected  for  the  other  Member  States  (2.8% 
In  Germany  and  2.9%  In  France).(2) 
A straightforward  breakdowr  of  the  rate of  Increase  In  the  prices of 
final  expenditure  (Table  5)  shows  that  throughout  the  period  the 
very  moderate  trend  - which  was  sometimes  even  negative  - In  unit 
wage  costs was  a  critical  factor  and  that  the  Impact  of  the external 
disinflation  factors  In  1986-87  accentuated  by  the  gut lder's 
appreciation  has  been  very  marked.  In  addition,  changes  In  Indirect 
taxation  were  used  to  help  maintain  Inflation  at  a  low  level.  In 
1989,  for  example,  the  Impact  of  accelerating  Import  prices  on 
consumer  prices was  partially neutral lzed  by  the  cut  In  the  top  VAT 
rate at  the  beginning of  the  year. 
Throughout  the  1980s,  the  appreciation  In  the  guilder's  effective 
exchange  rate  (12  % vis-a-vis  19  trading  partner  currencies,  18% 
vis-a-vis  ERM  currencies)  was  more  than  offset  by  the  fa I I  In 
relative  unit  wage  costs.  In  1986.  and  1987,  when  cost 
(1)  According  to  the  Central  Planning  Bureau,  the  wage  share  fell  from 
85.5% of  Net  National  Income  In  1985  to 78.0%  In  1989. 
(2)  Commission  forecasts,  March  1990. -15-
competitiveness  deteriorated,  not  only  In  relation  to  the 
Netherlands'  19  trading  partners  but  also  In  relation  to  its 
European  partners  (see  Tables  13A  and  138),  a  tendency  for  profits 
to  be  held  back  In  the  exporting  sector  made  It  possible  to  I imlt 
market  share  losses.  Since  then,  a  further  Improvement  in 
competitiveness  In  relative cost  terms  has  been  recorded. 
In  1990,  all  the  components  of  consumer  prices  will  push  prices 
higher;  this  Includes  not  only  domestic  factors,  such  as  the  rise  In 
rents  and  In  the  price  of  gas  for  households,  but  also  wage  costs, 
the  rise  In  which  will  not  be  offset  by  a  contraction  In  profit 
margins  or  a  smaller  Increase  in  imports.  According  to  the 
CommIssIon's  forecasts,  unit  wage  costs  are  I Ike I  y  to  increase  by 
2.2%  in  1990  following  a  fall  of  1.2%  in  1989,  while  for  the 
Community  as  a  whole  an  Increase  of  4.5  Is  forecast  for  1990  and 
5%  In  1991.  In  manufacturing,  the  Increase  In  unit  wage  costs 
could  be  less  than  that  forecast  for  the  economy  as  a  whole.  The 
competitiveness of  Dutch  firms  In  relative costs  terms  could  Improve 
further. 
2.4  Balance of  payments 
Following  the  effects  of  the  collapse  In  oi 1  prices  on  the  trade 
balance  In  1986-87  and  of  portfolio  adjustments  on  the  capital 
account  In  1987-88,  the  Dutch  balance  of  payments  has  returned  to  a 
more  traditional  pattern.  The  current-account  surplus  (of  the order 
of  3% of  GOP  In  1989  and  1990)  Is  generally offset  by  net  outflows 
of  private capital,  the  balance of  which  conceals substantial  direct 
Investment  abroad  and  growing  foreign  demand  for  Dutch  securities. 
The  current  account  Is  the  only  macroeconomic  variable  whose  trend 
In  recent  years  has  differed  appreciably  from  that  In  Germany.  The 
differences  have  been  due  principally  to  variations  in  the  energy 
balance,  governed  by  fluctuations  in  the  terms  of  trade.  As  the 
Netherlands  Is  an  Importer  of  crude  ol I  and  an  exporter  of  natural 
gas  and  oi I  products  whose  prices  are  adjusted  with  a  time-lag  of 
sIx  to  nIne  months,  the  fa I I  In  prIces  on  I  nternat I  on a I  markets  1  ed 
fIrst  to  an  energy  surp I  us  In  1985-86  and  then  to  a  return  to  a 
sl lght  deficit  (see  Table~). 
Apart  from  the  changes  in  cost  competitiveness,  the  current  account 
has  also been  Influenced  by: 
-.the  upturn  In  domestic  demand,  and  particularly  In  investment, 
which  helped  to  reduce  the  trade  surplus  up  to  1987  and  led  In 
particular  to  a  sharp  Increase  In  Imports  from  Germany.  More 
recent I  y,  however ,  the  change  In  the  compos It I  on  of  growth  has 
caused  Imports  to slacken; - 16-
- the  balance  of  services,  which  Is  especial IY  sensitive  to  changes 
In  world  trade  (particularly  In  view  of  the  Importance  of 
transport  activities)  a~d  to  fluctuations  In  the  exchange  rate of 
the  dol tar  and  In  that  of  the  gul lder  In  relation  to  the 
currencies of  the  main  tourist  countries; 
- Investment  Income,  a I  so  very  sensItIve  to  f I  uctuat Ions  1  n  the 
dollar  and  to  Interest-rate  changes.  Given  the  size  of  external 
assets  (put  at  HFL  505  bn  In  1987,  or  117% of  GOP),  a  change  In 
yields  has  a  significant  Impact  on  the current  account.<1> 
Direct  Dutch  Investment  abroad  has  been  running at  particularly high 
levels since  the  1970s.  The  four  main  Dutch  multinational  companies 
play  a  key  role  In  this  regard,  since  they  account  for  two  thirds of 
such  Investment,  whIch  Is  concentrated  pr Inc I  pa I 1  y  1  n  the 
Industrial !zed  countries,  especial ty  the  United States  and  the 
United  Kingdom  (see  Table  12).  A series of  factors  Influenced  this 
trend,  In  particular  the  relatively  low  level  of  demand  In  the 
Netherlands  and  the  high  level  of  wage  costs  In  the  early  1980s. 
However,  structural  factors  are  also  Important,  such  as  the  I lmlted 
size of  the  national  market  and  a  level  of  taxation  which  Is  still 
one  of  the  highest  among  the  Industrial !zed  countries. 
During  the  last  two  years,  the  balance  of  capital  flows  has  also 
been  lnf luenced  by  portfolio  movements  connected  with  the 
announcement  of  tax  measures  In  Germany  (end  of  1987  - beginning of 
1988)  and  by  the obi lgatlon on  Dutch  banks  to declare  Income  as  from 
January  1988.  In  addition,  foreign  Investors'  demand  for  Dutch 
Government  securities  has  Increased  appreciably  over  the  last  two 
years. 
2.5  Completion  of  the single market;  lmpl !cations  for  the  putch  economy 
The  completion  of  the  single  market  could  well  have  a  relatively 
major  macroeconomic  Impact  on  the  Nether lands.  The  var lous 
estimates  which  have  been  made  In  this  connectlon,<2>  which  take 
account  of  the  Interact I  on  between  the  dIfferent  sectors  of  the 
economy,  point  to:  an  overall  more  significant  growth  effect  than 
the  average  growth  effect  for  the  other  CommunIty  countrIes;  an 
appreciable  Increase  In  production,  ental I lng  a  rise  In 
productivity;  and  an  acceleration  In  private  consumption.  The 
Importance  of  these effects for  the  Dutch  economy  arises essentially 
from  the  fact  that  It  Is  a  sma II  economy  whIch  Is  very  open  to 
Intra-Community  trade,  and  this  makes  It  particularly  sensitive  to 
(1)  The  level  of  this  Income  appears,  however,  relatively  low  compared 
with  the  volumes  Invested,  which  reflects  Dutch  multinationals' 
policy  of  reinvesting  locally.  Retained  profits  should,  In 
principle,  be  added  to  the current  account  balance. 
(2)  Commission  departments,  1988,  and  Central  Planning Bureau,  1989. -17-
changes  In  International  trade  and  to  the  anticipated  effects  of 
reduced  costs  on  trade  between  Member  States.  The  high  level  of 
direct  Dutch  Investment  abroad  adds  a  further  dimension  to  the 
lmpl lcatlons of  1992  for  this economy. 
However,  the  Implications  of  completion  of  the  single  market  could 
vary widely  depending  on  the  branch  of  activity under  consideration. 
Genera II y  speakIng,  the  sectors  whIch  are  dIrect I  y  or  IndIrect I  y 
Involved  In  International  trade  (distributive  trades,  transport, 
communications)  and  which  play  an  Important  part  In  the  Dutch 
economy  wl  11  be  the  first  to  benefit  from  the  opening  up  of 
front lers,  at  least  In  terms  of  product lon.  Taking  the  tert lary 
sector  as  a  whole,  however,  employment  may  wei  I  decrease  In  view  of 
the  expected  losses  arising  from  the  abolition  of  administrative 
barriers  In  particular  and  from  the  consequences  of  Increased 
competition  In  the  banking'  Industry,  for  example. 
In  manufacturing  Industry,  completion  of  the  single  market  could 
have  an  overall  positive  Impact,  In  terms  of  both  production  and 
employment.  App I  y I  ng  the  methode logy  developed  by  the  CommIssIon 
departments,<1>  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  export  performances  of 
Dutch  firms  and  of  the  positions  of  the  various  sectors<2>  has 
produced  the  following  findings: 
- In  the  Netherlands,  the  relative  Importance  of  the  40  sectors  of 
activity  Identified as  being especially sensitive to completion of 
the  Internal  market  Is  close  to  the  Community  average:  they 
generate  47  %of  value  added  (compared  with  an  average of  49  % for 
the  community)  and  45% of  employment  In  manufacturing; 
-export  performances<3>  are  favourable  In  most  "sensitive" 
activities,  not  In  terms  of  the  number  of  sectors  but  In  terms  of 
value  added  and  employment.  These  favourable  performances  are 
found  notably  In  the  group  comprising  the  high-tech  sectors  and 
the  largely  automated  sectors  (electrical  components,  chemicals) 
demand  for  whose  products  Is  growIng  sharp I  y  In  the  CommunIty. 
These  sectors  w  I II  very  probab I  y  benefIt  from  the  ex pans I  on  In 
Intra-Community  trade; 
(1)  "The  European  single  market:  Implications  for  Dutch  manufacturing 
Industries",  L.  Sleuwaegen,  1989. 
(2)  According  to  this  methodology,  40  out  of  a  total  of  120  sectors  of 
activity  (3-dlglt  NACE  code)  were  Identified  at  Community  level  as 
being  especially  sensitive  to  completion  of  the  single market.  They 
were  classified  Into  4  groups:  (I)  sectors  associated  with  public 
procurement  (Information  technologies,  telecommunications,  etc.); 
(I I)  more  traditional  sectors  characterized  by  the  existence  of  high 
non-tariff  barriers,  by  only  a  small  degree  of  openness  to 
International  trade  and  by  large  price disparities;  (I I I)  sectors  In 
which  extra-Community  trade  has,  untl I  now,  been  more  Important 
(shlpbul ldlng,  electrical  engineering,  etc.);  (lv)  sectors 
characterized  by  moderate  non-tariff  barriers  such  as  national 
standards  and  administrative  controls  (radios,  televisions, 
houselhold electrical  equipment,  etc.). 
(3)  Calculated  by  reference  to  the  rate  of  lntra-EC  exports  to  lntra-EC 
Imports. -18-
-the  export  performances  of  Dutch  firms  are  mediocre  In  sectors 
which  are  protected  by  non-tariff  barriers  and  In  which  major 
restructuring  could  take  place  (pharmaceutical  products, 
electrical  equipment,  etc.).  In  some  cases,  despeclalizatlon 
would  have  to  be  envisaged. 
Completion  of  the  single  market  could  also  bring  about  substantial 
ex pans I  on  by  Dutch  fIrms  abroad.  In  a  I  arge  number  of  cases,  thIs 
could  strengthen  the  activities  of  multinationals  in  the 
Netherlands.  In  other  cases,  however,  there  Is  a  tendency  for 
activities  to  be  relocated  (mainly  machine-tools,  assembly 
operations).  The  conduct  of  economic  pol Icy  could  Influence  the  way 
In  which  these  movements  may  offset  one  another,  In  terms  of 
activity and  employment. 
3.  PUBLIC  FINANCE 
3.1  Fiscal  pol jcv 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  trend of  fiscal  pol Icy  Is  laid  down  within  a 
med I  urn-term  framework.  The  government  sets  annua I  quantI fled 
targets  for  a  four-year  period:  the  targets  relate  to  the  deficit 
(expressed  as  a  percentage  of  net  national  Income),  the  burden  of 
taxation  and  social  security  contributions,  non-tax  revenues  and 
expenditure  (In  nominal  terms).  Since  the  early  1980s,  a 
medium-term  adjustment  target  has  been  the  priority  In  the 
preparation  of  budgetary  programmes.  However,  the  budget  balance 
has  fluctuated  widely  since  1985.  The  effects  of  the  reverse  oil 
shock  but  also sizeable expenditure overruns  and  an  economic  context 
which  differed  from  the  proJections  have  produced  an  outturn  which 
diverges  appreciably  from  the  forecast  path. 
The  1982  government  agreement  set  targets  for  central  government  and 
the  local  authorities  together.<1)  The  1986  agreement,  covering 
the  period  1987-90,  related solely  to  the  central  government  budget; 
its  aim  was  to  cut  the  defIcIt  from  8  % of  net  nat lona I  1 ncome  1 n 
1987  to  5  1/4%  In  1990.  The  1987-90  programme  contained 
expenditure  cuts  for  goods  and  services  and  for  transfers.  It  was 
intended  that  the  burden  of  taxation  and  social  security 
contrlbutlons(2)  should  at  least  stabilize  at  the  1986  level.  No 
target  was  set  for  the  publ lc  debt. 
(1)  For  1986,  the  target  for  the  central  government  net  balance  to  be 
financed  was  6%  of  NNI  while  that  for  central  government  and  the 
local  authorities  taken  together  was  7.5  %. 
(2)  The  Dutch  authorities use  the  concept  of  .. collective burden  .. ,  defined 
as  the  sum  of  direct  taxes,  Indirect  taxes,  social  security 
contributions,  and  certain  non-tax  revenues  such  as  receipts  from 
natural  gas  sales. -19-
All  In  all,  medium-term  programming  has  been  efficient  as  regards 
f I  nanc I  a I  ba I  ances,  but  much  I  ess  so  as  regards  expendIture  and 
receipts. 
For  the  whole  of  general  government,  total  expenditure  (national 
accounts  definition)  has  fallen  by  2  points  of  GOP  compared  with 
1985,  to  stand  at  almost  57.5%  In  1989.  This  fal I  was  due  mainly 
to  the  I Imitation  Imposed  In  respect  of  expenditure  on  publ lc 
consumptIon  (wage  freeze  and  restrIct I  on  on  emp I  oyment)  and  to  a 
reduction  In  subsidies  from  1988  (abolItion  of  the  investment 
allowance  scheme).  Public  Investment  has  also  fallen  (-0.3  of  a 
point  of  GOP).  The  share of  revenue  decl lned  from  55% to 52.2% of 
GOP  (see  Tables  15A  and  158).  Net  borrowing,  which  had  been  cut 
from  7.1% of  GOP  In  1982'  to  4.8%  In  1985,  Increased  to  6.5%  at 
the  time of  the  reverse oi I  shock  but  was  back  to 5.3%  In  1989  (see 
Table  14,  heading  5). 
Central  government  net  borrowing  requirement 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
A§  ~ Qf  n~t natignal  ln~gm~ 
Target  (Including off-budget  -8.5 -5  3/4 -8  -7  -6  -5  1/4 
expenditures,  excluding 
early  loan  repayments) 
Out turn  -7.0 -6.5  -7.5 -6.4 -5.9  -
A§  ~ Qf  GgP 
Out turn  -6.4 -5.8  -6.9 -5.8 -5.3  -
Movements  In  natural  gas  revenue  made  It  more  difficult  to  attain 
the  target  set  by  the  1986  programme.  Given  the  time-lag  in 
adjusting  prices,  natural  gas  revenue  fell  particularly  sharply  In 
1987.  In  1985  It  stood  at  the  record  level  of  5.9% of  GOP  whereas 
In  1989  It  was  down  to  1.3 %.  When  It  became  clear,  In  mld-1986, 
that  It  would  not  be  possible  to attain the  target  set  for  1987,  the 
Government  adopted  a  package  of  measures  provIding  for  add It lona I 
expenditure cuts and  Increases  In  tax  revenue.  As  a  result of  these 
measures,  the  Increase  In  the deficit  In  1987  was  I lmlted  and  It  was 
subsequently  brought  back  to  a  path  close  to  the  original  targets. 
Half  of  the  fa I I  in  natural  gas  revenue  was  thus  offset  by 
expenditure cuts and  half  by  an  Increase  In  Indirect  taxation. 
At  the  beginning  of  1988,  the  Government  was  also  prompted  to 
tighten  the  rules  on  budgetary  dlsclpl lne,  because  of  sizeable 
overruns  of  appropriations,  and  the  failure  to  offset  Increases  In 
expenditure. -20-
The  November  1989  government  agreement  set  a  target  for  the  central 
government  deficit  to  be  reduced  from  a  level  estimated  at  5  1/4% 
of  net  national  Income  In  1990  to  3  1/4%  In  1994.(1) 
This  target  was  formulated  against  the  background  of  the  decisions 
taken  on  additional  expenditure  and  the  savings  to  be  made. 
Compared  with  the  original  basel lne  forecast,  the  Increase  In 
central  government  expenditure  should  be  due  mainly  to  new  measures 
In  the  fields of  the environment  (In particular  Investment  In  publ lc 
transport),  social  security  (child  allowances),  justice,  the  labour 
market  and  above  alI  the  restoration  of  the  I Ink  between  the  trend 
In  wages  In  the  publ lc sector  and  different  social  security benefits 
and  the  trend  In  contractual  wages  In  the  private  sector.  With  a 
view  to  1 lmltlng  the  possible consequences of  this  latest measure  on 
pub I I  c  expendIture,  two  condItIons  have  been  defIned:  the  I I  nkage 
could  be  suspended  (I)  If  wage  Increases  In  the  private  sector  were 
not  "responsible",  and  this  could  be  the  case  If  they  exceeded  the 
sum  of  the  I  ncr ease  In  the  prIce  I  eve I  and  productIvIty  gaIns  In 
such  a  way  that  It  would  harm  employment  perspectives,  and  (I I)  If 
the  rise  In  the  number  of  social  security  recipients was  such  that  a 
significant  Increase  In  the  col lectlve  burden  would  be  Inevitable. 
These  addItIon  a I  expendItures  decIded  by  the  new  Government  w  I I I 
probably  be  offset  In  part  by  a  slight  Increase  In  taxation  but 
chiefly  by  wlndfal I  gains  In  revenue,  estimated  on  the  basis of  the 
outturn  achieved  for  the  first  months  of  1989.  The  less  favourable 
trend  for  this  revenue  In  the  closing  months  of  1989  has  however 
revealed  the  danger  that  the  target  for  both  1990  and  1994  might  not 
be  met.  The  Government  has  moreover  already  reacted  by  deciding  to 
postpone  certain new  expenditures. 
In  the  context  of  the  aim  of  reducing  central  government's  share  In 
the  economy,  a  privatization  programme  was  carried  out.  The  State 
surrendered  holdings  In  many  enterprises.<2>  Since  1985,  prlvatl-
satlon receipts were  estimated at  some  HFL  4.6 bl I lion  (1% of  GOP). 
In  addition,  the  autonomy'of  certain  public  enterprises  or  depart-
ments  was  Increased.  The  post  and  telecommunications  services  were 
turned  Into  companies  and  so  was  the  national  printing  enterprise. 
Other  services were  either  converted  Into  companies  and  sold  to  the 
private sector,  or  became  concessions. 
3.2  Changes  In  taxation 
The  burden  of  taxes  and  social  security  contributions  In  the 
Netherlands  remains  high  compared  with  the  other  Community 
countries,  associated  with  a  high  level  of  social  protection. 
(1)  I .e.  from  5% of  GOP  In  1990  to  3% of  GOP  In  1994. 
(2)  The  major  enterpr lses  were  KU.4,  the  Neder landsche 
Mlddenstandsbank(NMB)  and  OSM  (Dutch  State  Mines,  operat lng  In  the 
chemical  Industry). 1) 
-21-
Overall,  after  fluctuating  among  others  In  line  with  the  measures 
taken  to  I lm It  the  pub II c  defIcIt,  the  burden  has  returned  to  the 
level  of  the  early  1980s.  Although  Its  reduction  was  not  the  prime 
obJective  of  the  Dutch  authorities,  they  have  nevertheless 
endeavoured  not  to  Increase  the  "col lectlve burden"  In  recent  years. 
In  addition,  social  security  charges  have  been  reduced  to  encourage 
the  moderation  of  wage  costs  and  they  have  been  used  In  connection 
with  labour  market  pol Icy  In  order  to  help  young  people  and  the  long 
term  unemployed  to  find  work.  But  It  Is  only  recently  that  radical 
reforms  have  been  Introduced  with  regard  to  corporate  taxation 
(1988)  and  personal  taxation  (1990). 
The  reform  of  personal  Income  tax,  which  came  Into  force  on 
1  January  1990,  Is  I  arge I  y  based  on  proposa Is  made  by  a  spec I  a I 
Commlsslon.(1)  The  principal  aim  of  this  reform  was  to  slmpl lfy  the 
system  while  maintaining  budget  neutrality.  However,  during  the 
preparatory  discussions  It  was  decided  to  associate  the  reform  with 
tax  cuts;  this operation was  facl lltated by  the  actual  and  currently 
expected  windfall  gains  In  tax  revenue  which  enable  the  target  set 
for  the  budget  deficit  to be  met. 
The  main  elements of  this  reform  are: 
-the col lectlon  of  Income  tax  and  social  security contributions on 
the  same  basis and  In  a  single operatlon;<2> 
- the  reduction of  the  number  of  tax  rates;(3) 
-the reduction  In  the  top marginal  rate  from  72%  to 60  %; 
-the  I lmltlng of  tax  deductions; 
The  gross  revenue  shortfall  due  to  the  reduction  of  tax  rates  has 
been  estimated  at  HFL  6.5 billion  or  1.3% of  GOP.  The  broadening 
of  the  tax  base  resulting  from  the  reduction  or  elimination  of 
certain  tax  deductlons<4>  (costs  of  a  mixed  nature  Incurred  In  the 
course  of  professional  activities)  should  produce  an  additional 
HFL  2.4 bl I I ion  In  revenue. 
Overall,  the  net  effect  on  revenue  In  1990  would  be  a  shortfall  of 
between  HFL  4  billion  and  HFL  4.5 billion,  or  0.9%  of  GOP.  The 
effect  of  the  reform  on  taxpayers'  disposable  Income  wl  1 I,  In 
general,  be  more  favourable  for  lower  Income  categories. 
(1)  The  Commission  was  chaired  bY  Professor  Oort. 
(2)  In  order  to  enable  the  combined  payment  to  be  collected  on  the  same 
basis,  the  burden of  social  security contributions which  was  formerly 
payable  by  employers  was  shifted  to  employees,  who  receive  a 
compensatory  allowance. 
(3)  The  number  of  tax  rates  Is  reduced  to  three:  35  %,  50  % and  60  %. 
The  lowest  rate  of  35%  applies  to  the  first  HFL  42,123 of  taxable 
Income  (some  80% of  taxpayers  are  In  this bracket);  It  Is  made  up  of 
a  rate of  22%  In  respect  of  social  security contributions and  a  rate 
of  13%  In  respect  of  Income  tax. 
(4)  The  upper  I lmlt  for  the  authorized  flat-rate  deduction  was  raised  by 
25  %. -22-
In  order  to  combat  tax  evasion  In  connection  with  Income  from 
savIngs,  a  system  was  I  nt reduced  as  of  the  tax  year  1987  whIch 
requires  banks  to  report  on  fixed  Incomes  to  the  tax  authorities. 
Withholding  tax  on  dividends  remains  unchaged  at  25  %. 
In  March  1990,  the  Government  set  up  a  new  Commission  to  look  Into 
ways  of  simplifying  personal  Income  tax,  to  examine  the  links  with 
corporation  tax  and  to  adjust  certain  rules  that  had  been 
criticized.  An  Initial  report  Is  expected  to be  produced  In  1991. 
Corporate  taxation  has  been  amended  several  times,  but  the  most 
Important  measure  was  the  suspension  In  1988  of  the  WIR  Investment 
allowance  scheme  and  of  the  deductions  allowed  for  stocks  and  other 
assets.  Firms  were  compensated  for  the  loss  of  these  allowances  by 
the  shift  of  welfare  contributions  for  child  allowances  from 
employees  to  the  central  government  budget,  and  by  a  reduction  In 
corporate  income  tax  from  42%  to  40%  for  the  first  HFL  250  000  and 
to  35%  for  profits above  that  amount. 
Indirect  taxes  were  first  raised  and  then  lowered:  both  were 
measures  taken  In  the  context  of  the  pol Icy  which  aimed  Initially at 
centro Ill ng  the  budget  defIcIt  and  then  at  contrIbutIng  to  wage 
moderation.  The  raising of  VAT  and  of  certain excise duties  In  1987 
was  Intended  to  I lmlt  the  widening  of  the deficit  resulting  from  the 
fall  In  natural  gas  revenue.  The  cut  In  the  top  rate  of  VAT  In 
January  1989  represents  a  move  towards  the  rates  In  force  In  the 
other  countries of  the  Community  and  was  also decided  In  the  context 
of  the  policy  of  wage  moderation,  In  order  to  preserve  purchasing 
power.  A  further  cut  In  the  top  rate  of  VAT  Is  planned  to  take 
place  between  now  and  1994,  provided  that  It  does  not  jeopardize  the 
objectives  laid  down  In  the  government  programme. 
3.3  Local  authorities and  social  secyrlty  funds 
The  loca 1  author 1  t les'  def lc It  was  cut  from  0. 7  %  to  0.3 x<1 >  of 
GOP  between  1985  and  1989. 
The  local  authorities  occupy  a  relatively  Important  position  In 
Dutch  pub 1  1  c  f 1  nances,  s I  nee  theIr  expendIture  represents  30  %  of 
the  expenditure  of  general  government.  However,  their  autonomy  Is 
very  limited  Insofar  as  their  main  areas  of  operation  are  largely 
regulated  by  the  central  government.  In  addition,  the  local 
authorities  are  required  by  law  to  balance  their  current  accounts, 
and  may  borrow  on I  y  in  order  to  fInance  capIta I  expendIture.  Yet 
their  own  receipts  represent  no  more  than  10%  of  their  total 
revenue,  with  the  remainder  coming  from  central  government  grants. 
(1)  From  0.8% to 0.4% of  net  national  Income. -23-
The  autonomy  of  the  toea I  authorItIes  cou I  d,  however,  I  ncr ease  In 
future,  since  the  government  has  begun  to  Incorporate  special 
purpose  transfers  In  the  general  transfers  made  to  the 
Municipal ltles and  Provinces  Fund.(1) 
As  part  of  the  fiscal  adjustment  pol Icy,  the  government  has 
concluded  agreements with  the  local  authorities on  the  principles of 
transfers  to  the  Municipalities  and  Provinces  Fund  and  on  reducing 
special  purpose  transfers.  Between  1983  and  1989,  central 
government  transfers  fell  by  11.5  %;  the  fall  related  chiefly  to 
transfers  Intended  for  specific  expenditure,  notably  unemployment 
benefits and  subsidized  housing. 
However,  for  the  soc I  a 1  securIty  sector  as  a  who I  e,  the  reforms 
Introduced  during  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  did  not  In  general 
produce  the  resu Its  expected.  The  purpose  of  the  reform  pI an  of 
1986-87  was  to  Increase  the  economic  efficiency  of  social  security 
expenditure  and  to  slow  down  Its  rise,  while  continuing  to  respect 
the  principles  of  social  justice.  In  the  unemployment  scheme,  the 
reform  has  succeeded  In  curbing  expenditure  (In  1989)(2);  however 
as  regards  the  lnval ldlty-scheme,  the  effect  of  the  reform  In  terms 
of  overal I  expenditure  has  been  less  favorable  than  expected, 
chiefly  because  the  Increase  In  the  number  of  people  receiving 
benefIts  offset  the  reI at I  ve  fa I I  In  the  I  nd I  vI dua I  benefIts 
themse I  ves.  The  access  crIteria  for  I  nva I I  d I ty  are,  In  the 
Netherlands,  generally  wider  than  In  the  other  Community  countries, 
a  situation  which  may  explain  the  high  number  of  recipients  (see 
Table  3).(3) 
The  rate  of  I  ncr  ease  of  soc I  a I  securIty  expendIture  has,  however, 
been  appreciably  curbed  as  a  result  of  the  freezing  of  the  minimum 
wage  to  which  most  benefits  are  tied.  The  ratio of  social  security 
expenditure  to  GOP  which  had  fa I len  In  1984-85  because  of  a  nominal 
reduction  In  benefits,  has  since stabl I lzed at  around  20  %. 
Over  the  medium  term,  the  social  security  fund  accounts  have  to  be 
ba I  anced.  In  recent  years,  theIr  over  a I I  ba I  ance  was  s I I  ght I  y  In 
surplus,  and  until  1988,  95%  of  their  expenditure  was  financed  by 
(1)  Special  purpose  transfers  relate  chiefly  to  housing,  the  social 
sector  and  education.  Since  1985,  the  number  of  specific  transfers 
has  been  sIgn If 1 cant I  y  reduced  and  theIr  tot  a I  va I  ue  decreased  by 
20  % whereas  over  the  same  per lod,  genera I  transfers  I  ncr eased  by 
9  "·  (2)  The  main  element  of  the  reform  was  the  adoption  of  a  maximum  rate of 
unemp I  oyment  benefIt  equ Iva I  ent  to  70  %  ( Instead  of  the  prevIous 
80  %)  of  the  el lglble  proportion  of  the  last  wage  earned,  or  of  the 
minimum  wage,  depending  on  the  case. 
(3)  Among  those  eligible,  for  Instance,  are  persons  who,  as  a  result  of 
sickness  or  Infirmity,  cannot  earn  the  "normal"  earnings  taking 
account  of  their  training.  In  most  of  the other  Community  countries, 
the  earning  abl I lty  must  be  reduced  to  less  than  a  proportion of  the 
normal  earnings  (e.g.  1/3  In  France,  Italy,  Belgium,  1/2  In  the  FRG). -24-
contributions.  Starting  In  1989,  however,  the  share  of  central 
government  transfers wt  I I  be  higher  (some  7% to 9% of  revenue),  as 
a  resu It  of  the  changes  made  such  as  the  shIft  from  employers  to 
central  government  of  con·trlbutions  to  the  child  allowance  scheme 
(in  order  to  compensate  for  the  abol It ton  of  the  investment 
allowance  scheme)  and  the  amalgamation  of  contributions  with 
personal  Income  tax  as  part  of  the  income  tax  reform. 
3.4  The  flnancjng of  the deficit  and  the  oyb! lc  debt 
The  persistence  of  the  budget  deficit  and  the  Increase  In  the  need 
for  refinancing,  attributable  to  redemption  payments  on  the  public 
debt,  make  the  central  government  a  large  borrower  on  the  capital 
markets. 
The  Dutch  authorities  have  generally  sought  to  limit  the  .. monetary 
f 1 nanc 1 ng ..  of  the  pub I I  c  defIcIts  and  to  f 1 nance  themse I  ves  a I  most 
exc!uslvely on  the  domestic  capital  market  (see Table  16). 
In  the  context  of  a  money  supply  pol Icy  based  on  an  analysis  of  the 
counterparts  of  money  creation,  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  considers 
that: monetary  financing  Is  any  net  increase  In  the  short-term  debt 
with  the  central  bank,  the  banking  sector  and  the  private  non-bank 
sector.  Banks'  purchases  of  I  ong-term  pub I i c  secur it I  es  are 
considered  to  be  money  creation on  the  banks'  Initiative. 
Since  1983,  the  central  government  has  formally  undertaken  not  to 
resort  to  this  type  of  monetary  financing.  Under  an  agreement, 
which  Is  renewed  each  year,  the  central  bank  Is  able  to  finance  the 
Treasury's  seasonal  needs  up  to  a  predetermined  eel I lng  (equivalent 
to  3%  of  the  preceding  year's  budget  receipts).  However,  during 
the  last  few  years,  only  marginal  use  has  been  made  of  this 
faci I tty.  For  local  authorities,  recourse  to  monetary  financing  Is 
I I  m  I ted  by  I  aw. 
Although  the  Dutch  authorities  have  never  resorted  to  direct 
financing  In  guilders  abroad  or  In  foreign  currencies,  .. external .. 
financing  has  Increased  In  so  far  as  subscriptions  by  foreign 
Investors  to government  bonds  have  risen sharply  In  recent  years. 
The  public  debt/GOP  ratloC1)  Is  sti II  rising  but  at  a  distinctly 
slower  pace  than  prev lous I  y;  It  went  from  46  %  In  1980  to  70  %  in 
1985  and  78%  In  1989.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  Increase of 
GOP  in  nominal  terms  has  been  relatively smal I. 
In  the  second  half  of  the  1980s,  the  central  government's  recourse 
to  the  market  was  heavll.y  Influenced  by  large  amounts  of  early 
repayments  of  subsidized  housing  loans,  which  were  particularly high 
In  1986  and  1987.  Although  this  enabled  the  central  government  to 
reduce  Its  direct  recourse  to  the  market,  the  housing  corporations 
(1)  General  government  excluding  social  security  funds. -25-
for  their  part  refinanced  the  loans  on  the  capital  market  so  that 
the overal I  recourse  to  the  market  remained  virtually unchanged.  In 
addition,  refinancing  of  the  central  ~ent  debt  has  become 
Increasingly  substantial.  For  central  government,  redemption 
payments  represented  25  % .of  the  tot  a I  recours~  to  the  market  in 
1985,  whereas  they  were  es.tlmated  at  46% of  the' total  In  1989.  It 
will  take  a  few  years  b'efore  the  effect  of  reducing  the  budget 
deficit  makes  Itself  felt  on  recourse  to  the  capital  market. 
In  the  last  few  years,  two  concerns  have  governed  management  of  the 
public  debt:  the  wish  to  Increase  the  average  maturity  and  the 
desire  to attract  foreign  Investors. 
Seventy  per  cent  of  the  debt  consists of  medium  and  long-term  paper. 
The  average  maturity  of  central  government  borrowings  ,has  varied 
appreciably  during  the  years  1980-90.  It  fel I  from  11  years  In  1980 
to  6.5 years  In  1983,  but  thereafter  It  Increased  and  now  stands  at 
around  8  years  (see  table  178).  The  last  bonds  Issued  In  1989  were 
for  a  ten-year  per I  od.  · 
The  Interest  of  non-residents  In  Dutch  central  government  borrowings 
has  I  ncr  eased  apprec i ab I  y  in  recent  years.  Their  share  in 
subscriptions  to  new  Issues  rose  from  25%  to  an  average  of  41  %of 
1989.  Non-residents  subscribed 61% of  the  January  1990  Issue.  The 
growing  credlbl I lty of  the  pol Icy  of  a  stable exchange  vis-a-vis  the 
German  mark  and  the  Issue  of  "bullet  bonds"  have  stimulated  this 
Interest. 
3.5  Appraisal  of  budgetary  targets 
The  formulation  of  budgetary  pol icy  targets  in  the  Netherlands 
raises  a  number  of  questions;  these  relate  to  (I)  the  entity 
considered  and  In  general  the  definition  of  the  public  sector, 
(I I)  the  problems  encountered  In  establ lshing  the  medium-term 
projections,  (I I I)  the  pro-cycl leal  nature  of  the  target,  and 
(IV)  the  fact  that  there  is  no  target  for  the  rate of  Indebtedness. 
Macroeconomic  analysis  in  the  Netherlands  uses  different  definitions 
of  the  pub I I  c  sector,  dependIng  on  the  area  of  Invest i gat ion.  The 
central  bank  monetary  analysis  considers  the  combined  deficit of  the 
central  government  and  the  local  authorities.  Budgetary  pol Icy  and 
the  management  of  expenditure  concentrate  on  central  government 
alone.  The  social  security  system  Is  generally  considered 
separately. 
However,  although  formally  the  objectives  set  for  the  deficit 
primarily  relate  to  central  government,  the  other  public  sector 
entitles  have,  in  recent  years,  indirectly  been  subject  to  the  same 
budgetary  stringency.  The  first  reason  for  this  Is  the  fact  that 
the  local  authorities  have  untl I  now  had  relatively  1 lttle autonomy 
In  the  management  of  their  expenditure,  In  terms  of  both  Its 
allocation  and  Its  volume.  Secondly,  the  social  security  accounts 
must  be  balanced  In  the  medium  term. -26-
The  mu 1  t 1  annua 1  budget  est I  mates  are _  based  on  med I  urn-term 
macroeconomic  forecasts  and  are,  conseQuently,  subject  to  the 
measure  of  uncertainty which  affects this  frame  of  reference. 
During  the  period  1987-89,  gross  domestic  product  rose  more  rapidly 
than  had  been  forecast  In  1986.  ThIs  I  ed  to  substantIa I I  y  hI ghar 
than  expected  tax at I  on  and  paraf I  sea I  revenue  - est I  mated  by  the 
Central  Planning  Bureau  at  almost  2  percentage  points  of  net 
national  Income  - which  enabled  the  government  to  reduce  taxation 
whlthout  jeopardizing  the objective of  reducing  the deficit. 
Furthermore,  the  mu 1 t I  annua I  expendIture  est I  mates  of  the  var lous 
Mlnlstr les  also  raise  the  problem  of  the  reliability  of  the  basic 
assumptions  (evolution of  the  school  population,  number  of  dwel I lngs 
necessary,  etc.).  The  systematic  overshooting  of  forecasts  by 
actual  expenditure  has  prompted  the  government  to  launch  a  critical 
examination of  the multlannual  estimates. 
The  strictness  of  budget  discipline  Is  another  aspect  of  the  same 
problem.  Noting  the  scale  of  expenditure  overruns,  the  government 
has  tightened  the  rules  of  the  restrictive  policy  which  primarily 
govern  compensation within each Ministry.  It  should nevertheless be 
noted  that  these  measures  have  produced  vI rtua II y  no  satIsfactory 
results.  Sizeable overruns  have  In  particular  been  recorded  for  aid 
to  Investment  - which  moreover  prompted  the  abol ltlon  of  the 
Investment  allowance  scheme  - and  for  the  departments  of  nat lonal 
education,  health  and  housing. 
Over a 1 1,  the  target  whIch  had  been  set  In  1986  for  the  defIcIt  In 
1989  was  achieved,  but  this  outturn  Is  largely  attributable  to 
higher  than  expected  tax  and  paraflscal  revenue  which  offset 
substantial  overruns  of  the  expenditure  forecasts.  In  addition,  a 
wIde  dIscrepancy  can  be  seen  between  the  fIgures  adopted  In  the 
draft  budget  and  the outturns  for  the  years  1985  to 1988. 
For  1990,  according  to  the  Introduction  to  the  budget,  expenditure 
should  be  7%  higher  than  the  forecasts  establ lshed  when  the 
government  agreement  was  concluded  In  1986.  In  addition,  the 
Implementation  of  the  Income  tax  reform  creates  a  number  of 
uncertainties  as  to  how  direct  tax  revenues  wl  I I  evolve.  The 
planned  reduction  In  VAT  could even  be  postponed  If  the  evolution of 
overal I  receipts  proved  to be  too  unfavourable. 
AccordIng  to  the  MIn I  ster  of  FInance,  If  race I pts  and  expendIture 
were  extrapolated  to 1994,·on  the  basis of  the  level  recorded at  the 
end  of  1989,  and  adjusted  by  taking  account  of  the  new  expenditure 
forecast  In  the  agreement  for  the  next  few  years,  the  target set  for 
1994  would  be  overshot  by  1  percentage  point  of  GOP.  The  burden  of 
tax at I  on  and  soc I  a I  securIty  contrIbutIons  Is  expected  to  fa II  by 
0.25  percentage  points  of  GOP  between  1990  and  1994.  The  measures -27-
necessary  to  prevent  this  deviation  will  be  examined  In  the  spring 
of  1990.  In  addition,  the  sl lght  contraction  In  the  growth  of  GOP 
forecast  for  the  next  few  years  rules out  any  hope  of  wlndfal I  gains 
In  revenue  as  high  as  In  1989.  All  these  factors  are  an  argument 
for  prudence  In  assessing the outlook  for  the  period  ahead. 
In  this  context,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  attainment  of  targets 
set  by  reference  to  nat lona I  Income  Is  strong I  y  pro-eye I I  ca I  In 
nature,  since  the  effort  to  be  made  In  a  period  of  strong  growth 
could  become  less  binding;  by  contrast,  In  periods of  low  growth  and 
very  low  Inflation  to meet  the  norm  was  more  difficult. 
Until  now,  the  Dutch  budgetary  authorities  have  not  set  a  precise 
target  for  the  level  of  the  debt.  However,  at  the  time  of  the  1989 
agreement,  the  government  formulated  a  declaration  of  Intent 
stating that  they  wished  to stabl I lze  It  as  a  proportion of  GOP. 
According  to  estimates  by  the  Finance  Ministry,  the  debt  ratio  Is 
expected  to  contInue  to  c I I  mb  unt I I  1993  before  fa I I I  ng  agaIn  In 
1994. 
However,  assumIng  that  the  dIfferent I  a I  between  the  Interest  rate 
and  the  rate  of  economic  growth  remains  unchanged  (at  almost 
4  points)  and  given  the  current  level  of  the  primary  balance 
(surplus of  about  1% of  GOP),  an  adjustment  effort  of  the  order  of 
0.5%  of  GOP  per  year  would  be  necessary  to  Interrupt  the  rise  In 
the  debt/GOP  ratio  In  1994.(1)  Stabilization  would,  however,  take 
place  at  a  relatively  high  level  (84%  of  GOP  for  general 
government),  and  this  wl  I I  continue  to  I lmlt  budgetary  pol Icy 
headroom  for  several  years. 
4.  MONETARY  POLICY 
4.1  Changes  In  ob!ectlyes and  lnstryments 
The  prime  objective  of  monetary  pol Icy  In  the  Netherlands  Is 
exchange-rate  stab I I lty,  In  the  form  of  a  pol Icy  designed  to 
maintain  stabl I lty  vis-a-vis  the  German  mark.  As  part  of  this 
policy,  the  authorities  also  endeavour  to  avoid  excessive  domestic 
liQUidity  creation.  The  choice  of  a  stable  relationship  with  the 
German  mark  has  been  motIvated  for  a  I  ong  tIme  by  two  types  of 
factors:  (I)  the  Important  part  played  by  Germany  In  the  external 
trade  of  the  Netherlands,  which  means  that  an  exchange-rate  move 
vls-a-v!s  the  DM  would  have  destabl I lzlng  effects  In  the  Dutch 
economy;  and  (I I)  the  priority  accorded  by  the  German  monetary 
authorities  to  price  stabl I lty,  which  makes  the  exchange-rate 
objective  consistent  wl~h  the  final  obJective  of  the  Dutch 
authorities. 
(1)  Calculations of  Commission  departments. -28-
MONETARY  POLICY  OBJECTIVES  AND  INSTRUMENTS 
Objectives 
-Stab! I tty of  the  exchange  rate within  the  EMS,  In  practice stab! I tty 
In  relation  to  the  German  mark; 
-to maintain,  over  the  long  term,  net  domestic  credit  expansion  on  a 
growth  path  which  Is  compatible with  the  growth  In  capacity. 
Instruments 
- Intervention on  the  foreign-exchange  market; 
- Instruments  designed  to  Influence  money  market  Interest  rates: 
( i )  off I  cIa I  rates:  dIscount  rate  and  cur rent  account  advances 
rate; 
(i !)  rediscount  and  advances  cell lngs  and  non-quota  area  (possibly 
Involving  an  additional  cost).  The  eel I lngs,  set  for  a 
three-month  period,  are  kept  within  anticipated  market  needs 
so  that  the  banks  must  use  the  additional  credit  provided  by 
the  central  bank  through  open  market  operations; 
(I I I)  day-to-day  management  of  the  money  market  through  open  market 
operations:  special  loans  arranged  under  repurchase 
agreements  for  fIxed  per I  ods  <rangIng  from  one  day  to  four 
weeks)  at  a  predetermined  Interest  rate; 
..1.  currency  swaps  for  periods  ranging  from  one 
week  to several  months; 
(lv)  compulsory  money-market  cash  reserve  requirement; 
- I imitation of  net  domestic  credit expansion: 
(I)  agreement  between  the  central  bank  and  the Ministry of  Finance 
to avoid  monetary  financing of  the  pub! lc deficit; 
(i I)  temporary  agreements  between  the  central  bank  and  the  banking 
sector  to  restrict  net  domestic  credit  expansion,  defined  as 
fo I I  ows:  short- and  I  ong-term  I  endIng  to  the  prIvate  sector 
plus  long-term  lending  to  the  pub! lc  sector  plus other  capital 
market  Investments  minus  long-term  I lab! I I ties.  The  most 
recent  agreement,  covering  the  period  from  July  1989  to  June 
1990,  Is  based  on  an  arrangement  under  which  non-Interest-
bearing  cash  reserves  are  deposited  with  the  central  bank  In 
proportion  to  the  extent  to  which  Individual  ceilings  on  net 
domestic  credit  expansion  are exceeded  (If appl !cable); 
-open  market  pol Icy  on  the  capital  market:  this  Instrument  was 
Introduced  In  July  1988  to  Indicate  to  the  market  the  desired 
direction  of  Interest  rates  and  the  Intentions  with  regard  to 
monetary  poI Icy. 5) 
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Wh I I  e  the  t rad It I  ona I  cornerstones  of  monetary  poI Icy  remaIn,  the 
changes  which  have  occurred  on  financial  markets  In  the 
1980s- Involving  In  particular  a  decompartmentallzatlon  of  money 
and  capital  markets  and  greater  mobl  I tty of  long-term  capital  - and 
the  tendency  of  the  Dutch  authorities,  as  elsewhere  In  Europe,  to 
give  freer  rein  to market  mechanisms  In  the  allocation of  resources 
have  gradually  led  the  authorities  to  realign  their  approach,  both 
as  regards objectives and  Instruments: 
-the  I lquldlty  ratio,  as  measured  by  the  ratio of  the  money  supply 
M2  to  net  national  Income,  (the  traditional  target  variable  of 
domestic  monetary  pol Icy)  has  lost  some  of  Its  value  as  an 
Indicator.  It  rose  from  35%  In  1980  to 55%  In  1989,  mainly  as  a 
result  of  changes  In  the  structures  of  bank  assets  and 
liabilities,  the  accumulation  of  liquidities  by  companies  with  a 
view  to  corporate  restructuring  In  anticipation  of  1992,  and  the 
economic  upturn  since  1984.  In  addition,  the  accumulation  of 
external  liquid  assets  held  by  residents  has  accelerated  sharply 
s I  nee  1987.  If  these  were  added  to  M2  the  measure  of  monetary 
expansion  would  have  been  even  more  significant.  The  Dutch 
authorities  have  not  taken  the  view  that  these  trends  presented 
per  sea  threat  of  Inflationary  pressures,  given  the  prevailing 
wage  moderation  and  the  fact  that  the  accumulated  I lquldlty mainly 
Involves  the  business  sector  and  not  households.  They  continue, 
however,  to  analys  the  pattern  of  liquidity  In  the  economy  very 
close I  y.  To  do  that,  they  have  turned  to  other  IndIcators,  In 
particular  the  analysis of  I lquldlty variations  by  sector; 
-the objective  of  exchange-rate  stability  has  become  dominant  and 
the  distinction  between  Internal  and  external  stabl I lty  pol Icy  Is 
tending  to become  blurred.  In  recent  years,  the  Dutch  authorities 
have  acted  to curb  growth  In  the monetary  aggregates only where  It 
has  been  accompanied  by  a  risk  of  exchange-rate  destabilization. 
Only  In  1986,  when  there was  pressure on  the gul lder,  and  In  1989, 
when  the·growth  In  the money  supply  was  seen  as a  potential  threat 
to  exchange-rate  stab I II ty,  dId  the  centra I  bank  take  steps  to 
I lmlt  domestic  monetary  expansion; 
- In  view  of  the  growing  difficulty  of  controlling  the  external 
contr I  but lon,  monetary  policy  Is  geared  to  controlling  domest lc 
money  creation.  A monetary  cash  reserve arrangement  Is  at  present 
the  main  Instrument  used  to  I lmlt  1 lquldlty  expansion.  The 
agreements  concluded  between  the  central  bank  and  the  banking 
sector  (for  the  periods  1986-87  and  July  1989/June  1990)  with  a 
vIew  to  I I  mIt I  ng  net  domest I  c  credIt  ex pans I  on  are  des 1  gned  to 
encourage  the  banks  to  expand  their  long-term  resources  and 
thereby  to  Induce  an  upturn  In  long-term  rates.  Given  the 
International  climate  of  deregulation  and  policies  giving  freer 
rein  to  market  behaviour,  the  central  bank  has  employed  more -30-
Indirect  means  of  restricting domestic credit.  The  1989  agreement 
Is  thus  based  on  a  monetary  cash  reserve  arrangement,  which 
requires  each  bank  to  hold  a  non-Interest-bearing  reserve  at  the 
central  bank  If  Its  net  credit  expansion  exceeds  a  predetermined 
level.  Market  forces  therefore  play  a  greater  role  In  the 
adjustment  In  that  the  volume  of  credit  Is  not  limited,  although 
the  proportion  financed  from  short-term  funds  may  ental I  an 
additional  cost; 
- In  addition  to  the  credit  restriction  Instrument,  the  central  bank 
has  a I  so  sought  to  I  nf I  uence  the  y i e I  d  curve  by  conductIng  an 
open-market  policy  on  the  capital  market.  To  that  end,  It  began 
to  bu I I  d  up  In  1988  a  port fo I I  o  of  med I  urn- and  I  ong-term  pub I i c 
secur It les;  this  amounted  to  some  HFL  3  billion  In  March  1989, 
when  the  bank  began  to  use  It  to  signal  Its  wishes  to  the  market. 
In  order  to  ensure  that  the  bul ldlng  up  of  this  portfol lo  through 
the  purchase  of  securities  on  the  primary  market  does  not 
constitute  monetary  financing  of  the  deficit,  the  Ministry  of 
Finance,  acting  under  an  agreement  between  itself  and  the  central 
bank,  has  withdrawn  the  equivalent  amount  of  short-term securities 
by  not  refinancing  those  reaching maturity; 
-with  regard  to  specific  exchange-rate  pol Icy  Instruments  for 
influencing money  market  conditions,  a  change  has  also occurred  In 
recent  years  with  the  Introduction  In  1988  of  money-market  cash 
reserves  designed  to  compensate  for  the  effect  of  certain 
market-enlarging  factors  which  were  tending  to  reduce  the 
effectiveness of  the  system of  advances  and  swaps  the  central  bank 
uses  to  Influence  short-term  interest  rates.  These  enlarging 
factors  Included  In  particular  the  growth  In  foreign  exchange 
reserves  connected  with  the  trend  In  the  external  balance  and  the 
non-renewa I  of  short-term  pub I i c  securities  as  a  counterpart  to 
the  building  up  of  the  central  bank's  portfolio  of  long-term 
securities. 
4.2  Monetary  aggregates  and  credit  expansion 
During  the  first  half  of  the  eighties  the  monetary  aggregate  M2(1), 
the  Netherlands  quantitative  Indicator  variable,  had  grown  at  fairly 
high  rates  averaging  7.5%  a  year.  Monetary  expansion  decelerated 
temporarily  In  1986-1987  to  4.1  %  annually  but  picked  up  again 
recently  with  annual  growth  rates  of  14%  In  December  1988  and  18% 
In  December  1989  (see  Table  18). 
( 1)  M2  1 nc I  udes  short-term  government  I I  ab I I it I  es  he I  d  by  the  non-bank 
sector,  companies'  assets  up  to  2  years  and  households'  demand 
deposits.  Households'  savings  deposits  are  only  partially  Included, 
according  to  their  turnover  (commercial  paper  held  by  companies  Is 
excluded). -31-
In  February  1986,  the  Neder I  andse  Bani<  and  prIvate  banl<s  made  an 
agreement  aimed  at  restricting  the  .. money-creating  activities  ..  of 
banl<s- their  long-term  lending  to  public  authorities,  long- and 
short-term·  lending  to  the  private  sector,  netted  out  with  their 
domestic  long-term  I labl I I ties- to grow  at 5.5- 6  %.  However,  the 
effects  did  not  become  apparent  before  the  last  few  months  of  the 
year  and  the overal I  Increase of  M2  was  considered  too  strong  by  the 
Nederlandse  Bani<.  In  December  1986,  the  agreement  was  thus  extended 
and  a  target  expansion  of  11  - 12% was  set  for  the  24-month  period 
1986-87  as  a  whole. 
In  1987,  banl<s  .. money-creating  operations  ..  came  down  from  9%  In 
1986  to  4  %,  mainly  because  long-term  lending  to  publ lc  authorities 
stagnated.  Two  developments  had,  however,  an  expansionary  Impact  on 
money  growth:  (I)  considerable  withdrawals  of  savings  after  the 
middle  of  the  year  In  reaction  to  the  announcement  that  banl<s  would 
be  obi lged  to  report  Interest  paid  to clIents  to  tax  authorities and 
(II)  the  reverse  of  capital  movements  from  net  outflows  to  net 
I  nf I  ows.  DomestIc  money  supp I  y  I  ncr  eased  by  4. 2  %  wh i I  e  nomIna I 
Income  growth  was  at  5.5 %.  At  the  end  of  1987,  monetary  expansion 
was  forecasted  to  remain  within  acceptable  limits,  due  to 
expectations of  a  weakening  of  economic  activity and  sustained price 
stability.  The  Nederlandse  Bani<  decided  then  not  to  reconduct  the 
agreement  made  with  commercial  banl<s  on  credit  growth. 
However,  Immediately  after  the  termination  of  the  agreement,  money 
supply  regained  a  high  rate  of  expansion  and  the  return  to  a  more 
moderate  path  was  a I  most  who I I  y  undone .  I  n  1988 ,  contrary  to  the 
proJections,  money  supply  M2  Increased  sharply,  two  thirds  of  the 
rise  being  due  to  domestic  money  creation.  Lending  to  the  business 
sector  I  ncr  eased  rapId I  y  In  connect I  on  wIth  the  pI cl<-up  1 n 
Investment.  The  demand  for  I I  quId  assets  by  f i nanc 1  a 1 
lnstltutlons<1>  was  exceptionally  strong.  The  increased 
preference  for  I lquld  assets  holding  might  be  explained  by  a 
flattening  yield  curve  and  by  greater  uncertainty  in  bond  and  share 
Investment. 
In  the  first  quarter  of  1989,  banl<s'  net  money-creating  operations 
accelerated,  expanding  by  17%  over  12  months,  In  anticipation  of 
restrictive  measures,  but  capital  outflows  and  destruction  of 
I lquldlty  by  publ lc  authorities  restrained  the  growth  of  money 
supply  to  3  %.  In  contrast  to  these  developments  net 
money-creating  operations  remained  practically  constant  In  the 
second  quarter  while  strong  capital  inflow,  In  part  due  to 
Increased  demand  for  Netherlands  securities on  the  narrowing  of  the 
Interest  rate  differential  with  the  US,  boosted  domestic  money 
supply.  The  Nederlandsche  Bani<  concluded  a  new  agreement  with  the 
(1)  Including social  Insurance  funds. -32-
banks,  In  the  form  of  a  "monetary  cash  reserve"  arrangement.  The 
agreement  Initially  covered  the  period  from  1  July  1989  to 
30  June  1990.  During  the  second  half  of  1989,  domestic  money 
creation  by  banks  had  returned  to  an  annual  growth  rate  of  around 
6  %,  and  the  agreement  was  suspended  In  March  1990.  This  was  also 
due  to  the  Inversion of  the  yield  curve,  banks  having  In  particular 
sold  long-term  publ lc  securities.  However,  the  contractlonary 
Impact  on  monetary  expansion  has  been  more  than  compensated  by 
capital  Inflows,  largely  due  to  non-resident  demand  for  Netherlands 
government  bonds. 
4.3  Assessment 
A country  of  the  size  of  the  Netherlands  which  maintains  a  stable 
exchange  rate  against  the  German  mark  has  I lttle  headroom  for 
pursuing  an  Independent  money  supply  pol Icy.  Any  restriction on  the 
growth  In  domestic  credit  tends  to be  offset  by  capital  Inflows,  al 1 
the  more  so  as  the  degree  of  substitution  between  Internal  and 
external  assets  Is  high.  Given  the  growing  mobility  of  capital  In 
Europe  and  the  assured  credlbl I lty of  the  exchange-rate  commitment, 
this  degree  of  substitution  Is  Increasing  and  the  yield 
differentials  between  the  Dutch  and  German  markets  are  tending  to 
narrow.  This  trend  has  been  apparent  In  recent  years.  The  speed  at 
which  portfolio  adjustments  are  occurring  Is  also  Increasing  with 
the  technical  Improvements  made  on  financial  markets.  The  scope  for 
pursuIng  an  Independent  monetary  poI Icy  Is  therefore  d lm In Ish I  ng 
further  and  the  level  of  the money  supply  Is  Increasingly  determined 
In  an  endogenous  manner. 
In  this  context,  the  changes  which  have  occurred  In  recent  years  In 
the  choice  of  the  Intermediate  objective  and  In  the  Implementation 
of  monetary  pol Icy  In  the  Netherlands  reflect  the  authorities' 
concern  to  adapt  to  the  financial  changes  under  way,  while  at  the 
same  time  maintaining  control  over  domestic  money  creation.  The 
I Ink  between  the  trend  In  the monetary  aggregate  and  price stabl 1 lty 
has  diminished  appreciably.  The  control  on  money  creation  from 
Internal  sources  alms  prlmarl ly  to  prevent  excessive  growth  In 
liquidity  leading  to  capital  outflows  which  could  Imply  exchange-
rate pressure. 
The  effectiveness  of  the  limitation  on  lending  depends,  however, 
so I  e I  y  on  the  banks  I  and  other  economIc  agents  I  at  t 1 tudes:  1 ts 
Impact  can  be  neutralized,  In  Increasingly  Integrated  markets  with 
growIng  oppor tun It I  es  for  f I  nanc I  a I  I  nnova t I  on,  eIther  by  recourse 
to  the  external  sector  or  by  the  development  of  new  forms  of  non-
bank  credit.  Admittedly,  Innovations  do  not,  as  yet,  seem  to  have 
played  a  significant  role  In  the  Netherlands  and  the  banks  do  not -33-
appear  to  have  shifted their  activities elsewhere  during  the  periods 
when  credit  conditions  were  tightened.  Increased  recourse  by 
companies  to  external  financing  In  1986/87,  which  doubtless  had 
something  to  do  with  the  tightening of  domestic  conditions,  did  not 
pose  a  threat  to  the exchange  rate. 
Generally  speaking,  however,  this  type  of  Instrument,  whl  le  It  may 
be  effective to some  degree  In  the shorter  term,  certainly cannot  be 
~nvlsaged on  a  permanent  basis,  both  on  account  of  the  posslbl I ltles 
It affords  for  sidestepping controls and  because of  the  drawbacks  It 
presents  for  competition and  for  dynamism  In  the  banking  sector. 
4.4  Exchange  rate and  Interest  rates 
Since  1~4 the  guilder  has  remained  practically  stable  against  the 
German  maN~.  Since  mld-1987,  It  has  maintained  a  position  In  the 
upper  part~  the  EMS  fluctuation  band.  Overall,  Its  effective 
exchange  rate- ~n  relat Jon  to  the  ERM  currencies  appreciated  by 
almost  5% between  1985  and  1987  and,  following  a  temporary  rise  In 
1988,  I t  has  come  back  at  I t s  1987  I  eve I . 
In  recent  years,  the  Dutch  author-+tl-es  have  followed  practically all 
the  Interest  rate  moves  Initiated  by  the  Bundesbank.  The  main 
exceptions  to  this  policy  were  at  the  beginning  of  1987  (during  a 
period  of  domestic  monetary  tightening  In  the  Netherlands)  when  a 
fall  In  German  rates  was  not  followed  and  during  the  first  few 
months  of  1988  (a  period  of  relative  German  mark  weakness)  when 
Dutch  rates  were  reI axed·  Independent I  y  of  those  In  Germany.  1 n 
order  to  Influence  market  rates,  the  central  bank  has  actively  used 
Its  open-market  pol Icy  on  the  money  market  and  has  responded  almost 
lmmed I  ate I  y  to  each  movement  In  German  rates  by  a Iter I  ng  Its  own 
official  rates,  which  have  gradually  risen  from  an  all-time  low  of 
3.75%  (advances  rate)  at  the  beginning of  1988  to 7.75 % today. 
Dutch  money  market  rates  have  genera I I  y  moved  In  a  very  s lm II ar 
fashIon  to  German  rates,  wl th  a  long  per lod  of  downward  movements 
between  1985  and  mld-1988  (from  6.3%  to  4.0  %)  and  a  significant 
and  virtually- continuous  rise  since  then  (from  4.0%  In  April  1988 
to  8.9%  In  January  1990)  (see  graph  3,  table  19A).  The  fall  In 
long-term  rates  up  to  1988  was  more  marked  than  that  of  short-term 
rates.  Their  rise  has  been  appreciably  less  pronounced  up  to 
October  1989,  but  accelerated  since  then.  The  yield  curve,  which 
has  been  Inverted  for  a  number  of  months,  has  followed  the  same  type 
of  trend  as  In  Germany. 
Despite  lower  Inflation  than  In  Germany,  an  appreciable  current 
account  surplus  and  the  Dutch  authorities'  continued  commitment 
since  1983  to  maintain  a  stable  exchange  rate  against  the  German 
mark,  there  Is  stl I I  a  positive  Interest-rate  differential  In 
relation  to  German  rates.  In  nominal  terms,  this  gap  has  become 
relatively  narrow  (of  the  order  of  0.5  to 0.7 of  a  percentage  point 
In  the  case of  short-term rates and  0.2 of  a  percentage  point  In  the 
case  of  long-term  rates):  It  can  partly  be  explained  by  the 
narrower  range  of  Instruments  aval lable  on  the  Dutch  market 
(part lcular ly  on  the  short-term  market).  The  public  sector 
debt/deficit situation may  also  have  some  smal 1  role  to play  In  that -34-
the  markets  cannot  predict  with  complete  certainty  the 
monetary/exchange-rate  pol Icy  reaction,  beyond  the  lifetime  of  the 
present  government,  to  any  future  need  for  budgetary  contract ton. 
Moreover,  keeping  the  exchange  rate  stable  Is  not  necessarl ly 
regarded  by  all  as  an  Irreversible  option,  as  Is  witnessed  by  the 
uncertaInty  In  the  face  of  the  In It I  a I  react Ions  to  the  pI an  for 
German  unification. 
This  differential  means,  when  adjustment  Is  made  for  current 
Inflation,  that  Interest-rate  levels  are  relatively  high  In  the 
Netherlands  (see  Graph  30).  It  Is  true  that,  taking  underlying 
Inflation,  the  differential  with  regard  to  adjusted  German  rates  Is 
pr_obably  smaller.  Nevertheless,  In  the  absence  of  expectations  of 
significantly  higher  Inflation,  this  differential  Indicates  that 
rea I  Interest  rates  are  hIgher  In  the  Nether I  ands.  ThIs  sItuatIon 
may  stem  from  two  types  of  factors:  either  there  are  more 
favourable  Investment  opportunities  In  the  Netherlands  than  In 
Germany  (which  seems  unlikely,  particularly  given  the  events  of 
recent  months)  or  there  Is  an  expectation of  relative deflation  due 
to  the  announced  budgetary  squeeze  necessitated  by  the  public  debt 
position.  This  In  fact  represents  a  continuation  of  the  situation 
which  has  preval led  for  a  number  of  years  and  Is  characterized  by  a 
budgetary  adjustment  poI Icy  pursued  agaInst  the  background  of  a 
fixed  exchange  rate. 
4.5  Experiences  of  a  de  facto  monetary  ynlon  with  the  Federal  Bepybllc 
of  Germany 
The  reduction  In  the  risk  premium  In  Dutch  Interest  rates  over  the 
past  two  to  three  years  has  Indicated  a  growing  credlbl I lty  of  the 
fixed  HFL/DM  parity.  Thus  the  Netherlands  provide  an  example, 
albeit  one  which  Is  relatively  recent  and  not  seen  by  everyone  as 
being  Irrevocable,  of  a  de  facto  monetary  union  between  a  small 
country  and  a  large  country,  at  least  In  Its  main  lmpl !cations  for 
monetary  pol Icy:  the  decisions  to  dispense  with  exchange-rate 
adjustments  as  a  pol Icy  Instrument  and  the  absence of  an  Independent 
money  supply  pol Icy. 
Two  arguments  can  be  brought  forward  In  favour  of  pegging  the 
gul lder  to  the  OM:  the  Federal  Republ lc  Is  the  most  Important 
trading  partner  of  the  Netherlands,  and  the  Bundesbank  provides  the 
nominal  anchor  at  a  high  degree of  price stab! I lty. 
The  tentative  conclusions  with  respect  to  the  working  of  a  monetary 
union  drawn  from  the  Netherlands  example  cannot  be  generalized  for 
two  main  reasons.  Firstly,  the  Netherlands  have  to  be  counted  as  a 
smal  1  country  that  typically  has  very  I lmlted  Influence on  the  union 
aggregates  but  adjusts  more  or  less  passively  to  monetary  policy 
measures  that  are exogenous  from  Its point of  view.  And  secondly,  a 
number  of  economic  simi larltles  with  Germany  makes  a  "coordinated" 
pol Icy  relatively easy. 
During  the  1980s,  these  two  countries  have  experienced  comparable 
macroeconomic  trends  In  various  respects  (see graph  5): -35-
- a  simi Jar  level  of  GOP  per  person  employed; 
-a  similar  pattern  of  supply  developments,  with  production 
potential  In  the  manufacturing  sector  and  labour  forces  moving  In 
para I I  e I; 
-a comparable  overal I  growth  performance,  with  however  differences 
In  time  patterns and  sectoral  contributions; 
- unemployment  rates  st I I I  remaInIng  above  acceptab I  e  I  eve Is,  but 
having  dec I lned  since  the mld-1980s; 
-the same  overal I  Increase  In  private consumption  prices during  the 
last  decade.  Both  countries  experienced  a  period  of  gradual 
disinflation during  the  first  half  of  the  1980s.  Since  1983,  with 
the exception of  1986,  the  Netherlands'  Inflation  rate  has  however 
been  lower  than  that  In  the  Federal  Republ lc,  mainly  due  to  wage 
developments  and  to diverging  tax  pol lcles. 
The  main  difference  In  macroeconomic  results  I ies  In  the  current 
account  trend,  this  largely  as  a  result  of  differing  energy 
dependence  rates. 
These  two  economies  also  display  a  number  of  common  structural 
characteristics.  The  composition  of  production  by  branch  of 
actIvIty  Is  s lm I I  ar.  The  maIn  dIfferences  are  the  ex I  stance  of  a 
I  arge  energy  sector  In  the  Nether I  ands  (whIch  even  became  a  net 
exporter  In  1985  and  1986)  and  the  role  played  by  the  production of 
capital  goods  and  transport  eQuipment  In  Germany. 
The  Question  arises  as  to  what  extent  the  convergence  of  the  main 
macroeconomic  results  stems  from  the  I Ink  establ lshed  by  the 
exchange-rate  pol Icy  - more  evident  since  1984  but  already 
discernible  before  then- and  from  Its  lmpl lcatlons  for  other 
aspects  of  economic  policy,  and  to  what  extent  It  Is  connected  to 
the  structural  similarities  which  exist  between  the  two  economies 
and  which  have  undoubtedly  made  It  easier  to  pursue  closely 
coordinated  pol lcles. 
An  analysis  of  the  conseQuences  of  the  1986-87  oil  counter-shock 
provides  a  number  of  Interesting pointers  In  this  regard,  In  that  It 
provides  an  example  of  adjustment  to  an  asymetrlcal  shock  when  the 
exchange-rate  Instrument  Is  no  longer  used. 
The  decline  In  ol I  prices  In  1986  led  to  a  significant  rise  In  the 
terms  of  trade  of  the  Federal  Republic  relative  to  those  of  the 
Netherlands.  In  1987,  a  deterioration  was  even  recorded  In  the 
Netherlands.  ConseQuently,  their  current  accounts  registered 
divergent  developments.  The  fal I  In  energy  prices  also  led  to 
significant  loss  of  publ lc  revenues.  The  response  of  economic 
pol Icy  In  the  Netherlands  can  be  summed  up  as  follows: -36-
-Dutch authorities  Immediately  announced  budgetary  restrictions,  as 
we I I  In  terms  of  I lm It I  ng  expendIture  than  IncreasIng  IndIrect 
taxation.  However,  the  Netherlands'  deficit  jumped  from  4.7%  in 
1985  to  over  6% of  GOP  In  1987,  while  the  fiscal  deficit  In  the 
Federal  Republ lc  rose only marginally  In  reaction  to  low  growth  In 
nominal  demand  and  tax  cuts  In  1986  and  1988; 
-monetary  pol Icy  has  become  marginally  tighter  relative to Germany. 
Given  the  large  asymmetry  of  the  shock,  the  pol Icy  of  pegging  the 
guilder  to  the  DM  was  successfully  carr led  out  while  nominal 
Interest  rate  differentials  remained  relatively  narrow  (1  to 
1.5 point  on  short-term,  0.5 on  long  term  In  1986-87),  which  means 
that  markets  gave  suffIcIent  cred I  b I I I ty  to  the  exchange  rate 
commItment.  However ,  thIs  I  ed  to  very  hIgh  I eve Is  of  Interest 
rates  In  real  terms; 
-confidence  In  the  ability  of  the  Dutch  economy  to  adjust  to  the 
gIven  rea I  shock  was  reInforced  by  preva Ill ng  attItudes  In  the 
labour  market.  Since  1985,  wage  settlements  seem  to  have 
Increasingly  taken  external  reQuirements  Into  consideration.  The 
relative  deterioration  of  the  terms  of  trade  seems  to  have 
reinforced  wage  moderation  relative  to  the  Federal  Republ lc. 
While  In  the  Federal  Republic  the  Improvement  In  the  terms  of 
trade  has  led  to  rising  real  wages,  the  Increase  In  nominal  and 
real  wages  was  smaller  In  the  Netherlands.  Also  In  the  following 
years,  Dutch  wages  growth  moderated  much  more  than  In  the  Federal 
Republ lc,  leading  to  an  Improvement  of  competitiveness  relative to 
the  Federal  Republ lc. 
5.  FINANCIAL  MARKETS 
5.1  Oyeral I  ylew 
Compared  to  continental  financial  centres  like  Paris  or  Frankfurt, 
Amsterdam  Is  rather  smal I.  The  capital lsatlon of  domestic  shares  In 
the· Nether I  ands  Is  about  one  ha If  of  that  In  France  or  Germany. 
Despite  this  lack  of  size,  Amsterdam  Is  an  Important  financial 
centre offering  a  wide  range  of  products  treated  In  active markets. 
Besides  the  principal  market  on  the  stock  exchange,  there  Is  a 
parallel  market  to  facilitate  the  access  of  smaller  companies  to 
risk  capital  and  an  options  market.  Dutch  financial  markets  can 
rely  on  a  developed  banking  system,  which  already  respects  the  8% 
solvency  ratio,  and  Important  Institutional  Investors.  In  addition, 
the  stable  domestic  currency  contributes  to  the  International 
attractiveness  of  the  Netherlands  for  carrying  out  financial 
operations. 6) 
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MEASURES  OF  FINANCIAL  MARKET  PEBEGULATION  SINCE  1986 
1  Janyarv  1986 
-A bond  can  be  Issued  with  a  minimum  maturity  of  2  years  Instead  of 
5.5 years  and  the method  of  reimbursement  Is  free. 
- Programmes  for  CommercIa I  Paper  and  CertIfIcates  of  DeposIts  are 
allowed. 
-Floating rate notes  became  possible. 
-Foreign  banks  establ lshed  In  the  Netherlands  could  lead  manage 
Issues under  a  reciprocity condition. 
-The calendar  requirements  became  more  flexible  and  authorisation  Is 
only  required  for  relatively  large  Issues  (above  HFL  50  ml  I I ion 
Instead of  HFL  15  ml  11  ion). 
- The  eel I log  on  the  Issue of  euro-gul lder  notes was  abolIshed. 
5  May  1986 
- The  Amsterdam  lnterprofesslonal  Market  System  started.  This  allowed 
banks  carrying  out  large  transactions  (HFL  1  ml  I I ion  for  quoted 
shares  and  HFL  2 m  I I I I  on  for  quoted  bonds)  to  bypass  the  brokers 
("Hoek I leden")  and  negotiate  freely  bid  and  offer prices.  For  smal I 
orders  lntermedlat ion  of  the  brokers  Is  obligatory,  commission  Is 
regulated and  banks  which  bring  In  a  large part  of  the orders  cannot 
participate  In  their  capital. 
1  January  1988 
- The  Issue  of  zero-bonds  was  a 1 I  owed.  These  were  forbIdden  unt I I 
then  for  taxation  reasons. 
22  Janyary  1988 
- The  arrangement  of  Programmes  for  Medium  Term  Notes  Is  permitted. 
1  Janyary  1989 
-The  calender  requirements  were  I lmlted  to  a  one  day  notice 
requirement  for  Issues  larger  than  HFL  50  ml  I I ion. -38-
6  March  1990 
- A  new  tender  system  was  Introduced  for  the  Issue  of  government 
bonds.  Applicants  pay  their  Initial  bid price,  If  above  the minimum 
prIce  fIxed  by  the  government,  Instead  of  the  unIform  prIce  I Ike 
determined  In  the  existing  tender  system.  This  led  In  the  past  to 
some  app I I  cants  effectIve I  y  payIng  I  ess  than  theIr  In It I  a I  offer. 
After  the  closing of  the  tender,  the  Issue  of  the  bond  continues on 
tap at  prices  fixed  by  the government. 
1  Jy!y  1990 
- Stamp  duty  will  be  abolished  and  commissions  on  stock  exchange 
transactions become  fully  negotiable. 
Memorandum 
Indexed  bonds  remain  forbidden. -39-
Nevertheless,  Amsterdam  lost  some  ground  especially  to London,  where 
about  one  half of  transactions  In  gul lder  bonds  occur.  In  order  not 
to  lose  Its  position  In  an  Increasingly  competitive  world  and  In 
order  to  locate  the  guilder  bond  market  In  Amsterdam,  the 
authorities  took  several  measures  since 1986  to deregulate  the  Dutch 
financial  system  (see  box  37)  . 
With  respect  to capital  controls,  the  Netherlands  abol lshed  the  last 
restr let Ions  on  capIta I  movements,  concernIng  the  Issue  of 
eurogullder  notes,  In  1986,  anticipating  an  EEC  Directive  which 
entered  Into  force  on  28  February  1987.  The  capital  movements 
whIch,  accordIng  to  the  new  dIrectIve,  are  to  be  I I  bera I I  zed  on 
1  July  1990  are already  free. 
5.2.  pemand  and  sypply  In  the  capital  market 
Insurance  companIes,  pens I  on  funds  and  soc I  a I  Insurance  funds  (see 
table  20)  are  the  main  suppliers  of  capltaiC1>.  In  1989  these 
Institutional  Investors  suppl led  45% of  long-term capital.  This  Is 
explained  by  the  large  proportion of  contractual  savings  In  the  form 
of  Insurance  premiums  and  pension  contributions  that  Dutch 
households  accumulate  In  order  to  finance  their  wei  I  developed 
social  security  system.  On  average  In  the  period  1985-1988  total 
savings  of  households  amounted  to  13.5 % of  disposable  Income,  of 
which  11.0%  were  contractual  savings,  leaving  only  2.5%  which 
could  be  freely  allocated. 
Until  recently  the  demand  side  was  dominated  by  the  public  sector. 
With  the  reduction of  the  publ lc deficit  since  1983,  the  pressure  In 
relative  terms of  publ lc  borrowing  on  the capital  markets  decreased. 
In  1988  the  pub I lc sector  took  about  38% of  total  capital,  1 .e.  the 
same  proportion  than  the  non-financial  private  sector,  whilst  from 
1981  the  demand  for  capital  by  the  pub I lc  sector  had  largely 
exceeded  that  of  the  private  sector.  This  favourable  evolution  of 
government  pressure  In  capital  markets  has  to  be  qualified  somewhat 
by  the  anticipated  reimbursements  of  loans  by  bul ldlng  fund 
societies which  took  advantage of  the  decl lne  in  Interest  rates.  In 
addition,  because of  an  Investment  boom  In  those  years,  the  private 
sector  considerably  Increased  Its demand  for  capital. 
The  openness of  the capital  markets  has  Increased  during  the  1980's: 
demand  and  supply  of  capital  by  the  foreign  sector  on  Dutch 
financial  markets  substantially  Increased.  Between  1982  and  1987, 
demand  was  I  arger  than  supp I  y,  I  nd I  cat I  ng  an  outflow  of  cap 1 ta  1. 
(1)  Financial  I labl I I ties with  a  maturity of  at  least  two  years. -40-
Behind  this  1 les  the  1983  devaluation of  the  Dutch  gul lder  vis-a-vis 
the  German  mark  and  also  the  announcement  In  1987  of  the declaration 
duty  to  the  fiscal  authorities  by  the  banks.  In  1988  the  Dutch 
capital  markets  again  registered  a  net  Inflow  of  funds  from  abroad, 
which  was  connected  to  the  announcement  by  the German  authorities of 
a  withholding  tax.  Also  In  1989  net  Inflows  were  recorded. 
5.3  The  Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange  and  the  International  guilder  bond 
market 
Almost  50%  of  the  intermediation  between  demand  and  supply  occurs 
in  the  form  of  shares  and  bonds  negoclated  on  the  Amsterdam  Stock 
Exchange.  Also  for  firms  the  stock  exchange  became  more  Important 
as  a  large  part  of  their  I iablllt les  took  the  form  of  shares  and 
bonds:  22  % In  1987  against  17  % In  1982. 
The  capitalization  of  domestic  shares  represents  about  50%  of  GNP 
in  1988  (see  tab 1  e  21).  It  Is  domInated  by  the  so-ca lied 
.. Internationals  .. ,  which  are  the  large  Dutch  multinationals  like 
Phi 1 Ips,  Royal  Dutch,  Unl  lever,  Akzo.  They  account  for  48% of  the 
ANP/CBS  all  share  Index  and  about  40%  of  total  share  turnover  In 
Amsterdam  Is  real lzed  In  these shares. 
The  outstanding  value  of  domestic  bonds  Is  about  the  same  size  as 
the  capitalization  of  domestic  shares.  It  Is  dominated  by  the 
government  as  a  consequence  of  the  accumulation  of  budget  deficits 
whIch  were  to  a  I  arge  ex tent  fInanced  by  pub I I  c  Issues. 
Nevertheless,  the  private sector  also  regularly cal led  upon  the  bond 
market.  The  value  of  quoted  private  bonds  amounted  In  1988  to  28% 
of  total  outstanding  domestic  bonds. 
Traditionally,  the  Netherlands'  monetary  authorities  made  a  sharp 
distinction  between  the  money  and  capital  market.  The  purpose  was 
to  prevent  long-term  gul lder  bonds  assuming  a  I lquldlty  function  and 
as  a  consequence  hampering  the  control  of  the  money  supply. 
Therefore,  the  Netherlands  required  slnct3  the  1960's  that  guilder 
bonds  Issued  In  the  Dutch  capital  market  be  reimbursed  In  at  least 
four  equal  annual  Instalments,  of  which  the  longest  term  should  be  a 
minimum  of  7  years.  Hence,  a  guilder  bond  In  the  Netherlands  had  a 
minimum  average  maturity  of  5.5 years.  Reimbursement  was  decided 
upon  by  drawing  lots. 
A  consequence  of  this  regulation  was  that  the  bond  holder  was 
uncertain  about  the  reimbursement  date  which  reduced  the  market 
I iquldlty  of  the  bond  and  made  treasury  management  more  difficult. 
In  the  euro-market  these  regulations  did  not  exist  and  gul lder  bonds 
of  the  bullet-type  (reimbursed  at  once  at  a  date  known  In  advance) 
could  be  Issued  there  up  to  a  certain eel I lng. -41-
Gradually,  however,  large  Institutional  Investors  accumulated  a 
growing  share  of  the  total  of  bonds  Issued  In  their  portfolio. 
This  lead,  because  of  the  law  of  large  numbers,  to  a  reduction  of 
the  uncertainty  concerning  reimbursement  dates.  Because  the 
reimbursement  rules  did  not  contribute  any  longer  to  the  efficiency 
of  monetary  policy  and  In  order  to  recuperate  some  of  the  lost 
financial  actlvlty(1)  due  to  uncompetltlve  Intermediation  costs, 
Dutch  capital  market  regulations  underwent  some  Important 
modifications  since  1986.  The  objective  Is  to  make  Amsterdam  the 
maIn  I  oca  t 1  on  for  gu I I  der  bonds.  ThIs  shou I  d  a I I  ow  for  a  better 
transmission of  monetary  pol Icy  signals  to  the market. 
With  respect  to  the  results of  the  deregulation  measures,  there  are 
Indications  that  a  part  of  the  trade  In  London  moved  back  to 
Amsterdam.  As  far  as  the  primary  market  Is  concerned  the  results 
are modest.  Private  residents continue  to  Issue  between  20  and  30% 
of  their  debt  on  the  euro-market  (see  table  22).  Non-residents, 
however,  seemed  to  have  slightly  increased  their  Interest  In  the 
Dutch  capital  market:  a  relatively  more  important  part  of  gul lder 
borrowing  by  non-residents  took  place  In  the  Netherlands. 
5.4  The  banking  system 
Two  Important  measures  characterize  preparation  for  1992  In  the 
Dutch  banking  system. 
The  first  concerns  the  revision of  the  so-cal led  "structure pol Icy ... 
The  structure  poI Icy  segregated  the  bankIng  and  Insurance  sector. 
As  of  January  1,  1990  this  pol Icy  was  I lberal lzed  In  the  sense  that 
the  Dutch  authorities  no  longer  a priori  object  to  mergers  between 
banks  and  insurance  companies,  that  Is,  a  declaration  of  no-
object ion  Is  stIll  required.  This  liberalized  system  Is  In  line 
with  the  rules  of  the  Act  on  the  supervision  of  the  credit-system, 
which  requires  a  declaration  of  no-objection  In  the  case  of 
participation  with  more  than  5%  In  other  enterprises  by  credit 
Institutions,  or  In  credit  Institutions by  others. 
The  second  series  of  measures  relates  to  a  number  of  collaboration 
agreements  among  banks.  The  Postbank  which  has  a  strong  position  In 
the  savings  deposits  market  (see  table  23),  was  prlvatised  on 
January  1,  1986  and  lntens)fied col laboratlon with  the  NMB  Bank  (the 
third  largest  bank  in  the  Netherlands).  ABN  Bank  and  Amro  Bank  (the 
numbers  1  and  2  respectIve I  y)  announced  a  merger  Invest I  gat I  on  on 
March  26,  1990. 
( 1 )  It  was  est I  mated  that  turnover  of  Dutch  government  bonds  in  London 
was  about  the  same  size as  In  Amsterdam. -42-
5.5  Households  and  their  sayings 
The  most  Important  development  which  was  observed<2>,  Is  the 
I  ncr  eased  attract I  veness  of  shares.  In  1982  about  9  %  of 
households'  financial  assets were  Invested  In  shares which  Increased 
agaInst  the  background  of  a  favourab I  e  stock  exchange  cIt  mate  to 
19%  In  1986.  After  the  stock  market  crisis  of  October  1987  the 
percentage  of  share  dropped  to  14  %.  A  I  so  bonds  I  ncr  eased  theIr 
share  In  the  portfol lo  of  households  from  16%  In  1982  to 17.5%  In 
1987. 
The  I  ncr  ease  In  Investment  In  secur It I  es  rna In I  y  occur red  to  the 
detriment  of  credit  Institutions  which  collected  a  relatively 
smaller  share of  funds  from  households  who  had  become  more  sensitive 
to differences  In  rates of  return.  The  share of  savings deposits  In 
the  portfolio of  households  decreased  from  51%  In  1982  to  44%  In 
1987. 
With  respect  to  the  International lzatlon  of  the  portfol lo  of 
households,  the  aval !able  data  suggest  that  the  larger  part  of 
savings  are  Invested  In  the  Netherlands  In  spite of  the  open  nature 
of  the  Dutch  capital  market.  The  main  explanation  for  this  Is 
probably  the  strong  currency  policy.  In  1987  the  share  of  foreign 
financial  assets  In  the  total  of  financial  savlngs·amounted  to  10% 
against  6.7 % In  1982. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
6.1  The  economic  situation  In  the  Netherlands  Improved  appreciably  1-n 
the  second  ha' f  of  the  1980s.  There  was  a  resumpt I  on  of  a  more 
sustained  rate of  growth,  leading  to a  marked  Increase  In  employment 
and  a  fa! I  In  the  unemployment  rate,  the  Inflation rate  remained  the 
lowest  In  the  Community  and  the  external  surplus on  current  account 
returned  to a  moderate  level. 
These  deve I  opl~tent  s  resu I ted  from  macroeconomIc  management  whIch 
enabled  the  Dutch  economy  to  benefit  from  favourble  International 
trends  and  to overcome  certain  negative effects of  the oil  counter-
shock.  This  management  was  characterized  by  a  relatively 
restrictive monetary  policy  based  on  a  firm  and  credible  commitment 
to  maintain  a  stable  exchange  rate  against  the  German  mark  and  by 
substantial  progress  in  the  budgetary  adjustment  field,  which  made 
It  possible  to  reduce  the deficit  and  to curb  the  rise  In  the  public 
debt  ratio. 
Structura I  poI I  c I  es  and  Incomes  poI Icy  pI ayed  a  major  supportIng 
role.  The  very  moderate  growth  In  wage  costs was  a  key  factor  In  a 
number  of  respects:  It  helped  to  re-establish  a  climate  conducive 
to  Investment  and  employment  growth,  It  played  a  central  role  In 
(2)  J.  SWANK,  L.  DE  HAAN,  F.J.  VELDKAMP,  Flnanclele balansen  van  gezlnnen 
en  bedrljven  In  Nederland,  1982-1987,  De  Nederlandsche  Bank. 
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reducing  the  budget  deficit,  and  It  kept  the  Inflation rate at  a  low 
level.  The  government's  lnf luence  on  the  wage  cost  trend  In  the 
pr Iva te  sector,  If  I  ess  pronounced  than  In  the  past ,  has  however 
been  Important,  with  measures  freezing  the  minimum  wage  and  the 
reduction  of  social  security  contributions.  The  readiness  of 
employers  and  unions  to  take  account  of  the  objective of  preserving 
or  lmprov I  ng  competItIveness  at  a  given  exchange  rate  and  of  the 
need  to  Improve  company  profltabl llty  In  order  to  promote  job 
creation also seems  to  have  been  crucial. 
6.2  The  progress  made  In  correct lng  the  dlseQull lbr ia  In  the  Dutch 
economy  Is all  the  more  remarkable  In  that  those  dlseQul I lbrla were 
part lcular ly  marked  In  the  early  1980s.  Furthermore,  the  1986-87 
o II  counter-shock  dId  not  have  the  same  Impact  as  In  the  other 
Community  countries.  It  necessitated  a  further  tightening  of 
budgetary  po II cy,  whereas  the  burden  on  monetary  poI Icy  remaIned 
relatively sl lght. 
However,  the dlseQul I lbrla are stl I I  pronounced: 
- the  public  debt  Is  eQuivalent  to  almost  80%  of  GOP  and  the 
Interest  payable  on  that  debt  absorbs  11%  of  current  revenue, 
which  Imposes  an  appreciable  constraint  on  the  room  for  manoeuvre 
In  the  budgetary  pol Icy  field.  The  general  government  deficit was 
still  equivalent  to 5.3% of  GOP  In  1989  and,  whl lethe budgetary 
programme  estab I I  shed  for  the  per I  od  1991-94  provIdes  for  the 
central  government  borrowing  reQuirement  to  be  reduced  gradually 
by  approximately  2  percentage  points  of  GOP  In  four  years,  there 
are  a  number  of  factors  which  cast  doubt  on  whether  that  target 
wl  11  be  achieved; 
-although the situation on  the  labour  market  Is difficult  to assess 
and  any  International  comparison  Is made  particularly difficult  by 
the  statistical  problems  It  raises,  major  diseQuilibria,  largely 
of  a  structural  nature,  stl I I  exist.  The  unemployment  rate 
remains  high  despite  a  participation  rate  which  Is  still 
relatively  low  compared  with  other  European  countries,  and  the 
mismatch  between  supply  and  demand  Is  becoming  Increasingly  ~cute. 
Rapid  and  continuous  progress  Is  essential  In  these  two  fields,  not 
only  to al lev late  the  current  problems  but  also  to prepare  the  Dutch 
economy  better  for  the  changes  which  will  occur  over  the  next  few 
years. 
6.3  The  Netherlands  has  already  had  some  de  facto  experience  vis-a-vis 
the  process  of  economic  and  monetary  unification  In  Europe  In  that 
It  has  maIntaIned  a  f 1  rm  commItment  to  the  obJect 1  ve  of  exchange-
rate stabl I tty  for  a  number  of  years  now  and  that  commitment  has  had 
lmpl lcatlons  for  economic  pol Icy  generally. 
Whl  le monetary  pol Icy  Is  principally determined  by  the  commitment  to 
maintain  a  stable exchange  rate  In  relation  to  the  German  mark,  the 
liQuidity  of  the  economy  and  domestic  money  creation  remain  useful 
Indicators  for  the  monetary  authorities.  The  Instrument  used  to 
I  nf I  uence  net  domestIc  credIt  ex pans I  on  may  be  effectIve  to  some 
extent  In  the  short  term.  However,  Its  use  cannot  be  con temp 1  a ted -44-
on  a  permanent  basis  and,  although  the  most  recent  .. gentlemen's 
agreement..  with  the  banking  sector  no  longer  has  the  same 
disadvantages  as  direct  credit  restriction,  there  may  be  doubts  as 
to  its  relevance  In  a  context  of  growing  capital  mobl  I lty  In  Europe 
and  Increased  competition  In  the  banking  sector. 
Open-market  operations on  the  capital  market  were  Intended  not  as  a 
new  monetary  pol Icy  Instrument  but  as  a  means  of  transmitting 
signals  to  the  market  regarding  the  desired  direction  of  Interest 
rates.  However,  the  Impact  of  those operations can  only  be  marginal 
and  very  short-term.  Generally  speaking,  It  Is  difficult  for  the 
monetary  authorities  to  Influence  the  level  of  long-term  Interest 
rates  directly  other  than  by  Influencing  long-term  Inflationary 
expectations  through  monetary  pol Icy  as  a  whole. 
The  positive  Interest-rate  differential  In  relation  to  German  rates 
has  become  very  narrow  In  nominal  terms  but  Is  probably  fairly 
sizeable  In  real  terms  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  factors exerting 
pressure on  prices do  not  seem  to be  as  strong  as  in  Germany. 
The  experience  of  a  stable  exchange-rate  option  has  also 
demonstrated  the  Importance  of  acquiring  Increased  room  for 
manoeuvre  In  the  budgetary  pol Icy  field.  In  view  of  the size of  the 
debt  and  the  Interest  burden,  which  are  Impeding  efforts  to  control 
expenditure  and  reduce  the  deficit,  the  aim  of  simply  stabilizing 
the  debt/GOP  ratio would  not  be  very  ambitious.  A priority medium-
term  adjustment  objective  which  Is  compatible  with  a  reduction  In 
the  debt/GOP  ratio  should  therefore  be  pursued.  Given  the  level  of 
the  primary balance(+ 1 %'of  GOP)  and  assuming  that  the  current  gap 
between  the  Interest  rate  level  and  the  rate  of  growth  of  the 
economy  continues,  such  an  objective  would  cal I  for  a  sl lghtly  more 
vigorous  adjustment  effort  than  Is  provided  for  In  the  programme  set 
for  the  period  1991-94. 
Certain  overrun  risks  are  already  casting  doubt  on  whether  the 
current  budgetary  programme  can  be  achieved,  particularly  In  view  of 
the  possible  consequences  of  restor lng  the  link  between  the  wage 
trend  In  the  publ lc sector  and  wages  In  the  private sector. 
The  contlnution of  a  moderate  wage  cost  trend  remains  a  key  element 
In  maintaining  the  Investment  ratio  at  Its  restored  level  but  also, 
in  the  context  of  the  completion  of  the  single  market,  In  Improving 
the  potential  consequences  of  that  for  employment  In  the 
Netherlands.  The  tax  reforms  are welcome  In  this connection  In  that 
the  reform  of  persona I  Income  tax  shou I  d  reduce  the  unfavourab I  e 
Impact  of  high  marginal  rates on  the  labour  market  and  the  reduction 
of  social  security  contributions  may  cut  labour  costs.  Over  the 
years  ahead,  however,  It  may  be  appropriate  to step up  these efforts 
and  to  pursue  a  pol Icy  which  takes  account  of  the  economic 
impl !cations of  taxation  and  paraflscal  charges without  jeopardizing 
the objective of  reducing  the deficit. -45-
The  1992  single  market  could  also  present  new  development 
oppor tun I  t I  es  In  the  f I  nanc I  a I  f I  e I  d .  I  n  recent  years ,  the 
authorities have  taken  a  series of  measures  to develop  and  modernize 
the  f I  nanc I  a I  markets  so  as  to  ensure  that  Amsterdam  retaIns  Its 
position among  the main  continental  financial  centres.  However,  the 
measures  taken  to  attract  trading  In  gul lder-denomlnated  government 
bonds  back  to Amsterdam  have  so  far  achieved  only  relatively modest 
success.  Generally  speaking,  activity  has  been  deregulated  since 
1986.  However,  the  rules  governing  defence  against  company 
takeovers  appear  to  be  rather  rigid  and  could  Impede  the 
International lzatlon  of  Industrial  enterprises  brought  about  by  the 
single market. -46-
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13.  Relative eye! teal  position,  relative prices and  costs 
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B.  VIs-a-vis  19  main  partners ..............................  16 -47-
Public finances 
14.  Main  publ lc  finance  Indicator ..............................  17 
15.  General  government  Income  and  expenditure 
A.  As  % of  GOP .............................................  18 
b.  As% of  net  national  Income .............................  19 
16.  Financing of  the  publ lc  deficit ........................... 20 
17.  Public debt 
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20.  Demand/supply  In  the  Dutch  capital  market ..................  26 
21.  The  Amsterdam  stock exchange ...............................  27 
22.  The  guilder  Bond  Market ....................................  28 
23.  The  Netherlands Banking  system .............................  29 
Graohs 
1.  Nominal  and  real  effective exchange  rate 
(unit  labour  costs - whole  economy  and 
manufacturing  Industry) 
Vls-i-vls  ERM  partners and  19  main  partners ................  30 
2.  The  evolution of  the  HFL ...................................  31 
3.  Interest  rates  In  the  Netherlands,  Germany  and  USA 
A.  NomIna I  short-term ......................................  32 
B.  Inflation adjusted short-term ...........................  32 
C.  NomIna I  I  ong-term .......................................  33 
D.  Inflation adjusted  long-term ............................  33 
4.  Short-term  Interest  rates:  3~month  Interbank 
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STATISTICAL  NOTES 
Unemployment 
The  CBS  (Centraal  Bureau  voor  de  Statlstlek)  has  been  publishing  the 
official  unemployment  figures  since  the  beginning of  1988.  The  series 
are  based  on  both  the  registrations  communicated  by  the  employment 
agencies  (GAB)  and  the  results of  the  CBS  regular  monthly  survey.  The 
statistics are  pub! !shed  as  a  three-month  moving  average. 
Up  to  1988,  the  official  figure  related  solely  to  unemployed  persons 
registered with  employment  agencies.  For  some  years,  the  surveys  have 
detected  assessment  errors,  showing  that  a  large  proportion  of  those 
registered  as  unemployed  (between  25%  and  30  %)  did  not  satisfy  the 
criteria of  seeking  employment  and  being  available  for  work  (because 
they were  working  In  temporary  jobs,  for  example). 
In  1987,  the  number  of  persons  satisfying  the  official  definition  of 
unemployment  was  est !mated  at  450,000;  the  ear ller  f lgure  (from  the 
Ministry  for  Social  Security  and  Employment)  put  the  number  of 
unemployed  at  686,000  for  the  same  year. 
Employment 
In  the  national  accounts,  employment  Is  expressed  as  person-years 
(arbeldsjaren).  This unit  Is  the  average  contractual  duration of  work 
for  a  person  In  full-time  employment.  This  figure  has  fallen  in 
recent  years. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  employment  expressed  as  a  number  of  persons 
Includes  persons  working  part  time  and  that  the  proportion  of  these 
workers  In  total  employment  Is  rising  each  year,  employment  expressed 
as  a  number  of  persons  Is  rising  more  rapidly  than  employment 
expressed  as  person-years. 
The  Introduction  of  these  two  concepts  has  implications  for 
comparisons  with  other  countries  of  data  concerning  productivity 
(output  per  person-year  In  the  national  accounts)  and  per  capita wages 
(wage  bl I I  per  person-year). 
Net  national  Income  <NN!l/Gross  domestic  product  <GoP> 
In  the  Netherlands  the  authorities  use  NNI  as  a  reference.  Budgetary 
policy  objectives  In  particular,  (borrowing  requirement,  collective 
burden  and  share  of  expendIture)  are  therefore  expressed  as 
percentages of  NNI  at  market  prices. 
The  difference between  NNI  and  ~DP are depreciation  and  the  balance of 
factor  Incomes  from  abroad.  In  1988,  and  at  current  prices,  NNI  was 
HFL  401.65  bl I lion,  and  GOP  was  HFL  451.23  bl I I Jon. T
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Table  3  Labour  market  indicators 
X  1000 
Labour  force 
Netherlands  - Eurostat 
- CBS 
EUR  12  - Eurostat 
Unemployment  (in 1000  persons) 
- registered unempl.  (GWL)(CBS) 
(official figures) 
- unempl.  registered at  the 
labour  offices(BZB)(Min.Soc. 
Aff.) 
- unemployed,  ILO  definition 
(WZB)  (CPB) 
- insured  unemployed 
Disablement  Insurance Acta 
(AAW/WAO)  number  of  persons 
(end  of year) 
Unemployment  rate 
- registered unemployed  (GWL) 
- unempl.,  labour offices  (BZB) 
- EUROSTAT,  nat.  concept 
- Standardized  EUROSTAT-rate 
Employment,  in thous.  man-year 
- total 
- enterprises 
- general  government 
Employment,  in  1000  of  persons 
Changes  in  % 
Part-time employment 
Characteristics of unemployed 
Unemployed,  less  than  25  years 
old,  x  1000 
As  % of unemployed  at  labour 
offices  (BZB) 
Unfilled vacancies  (x  1000) 
Duration of  unemployment  (BZB) 
(x  1000) 
- less  than  one  year 
- more  than  one  year 
* Estimations 
1984 
5773 
138607 
822 
756 
691 
746 
13,2 
14,5 
12,3 
4.528 
3.192 
730 
830 
318,9 
38,8 
15,3 
386 
436 
1985 
5812 
139723 
761 
699 
679 
762 
12,3 
13,3 
10,5 
4.598 
3.255 
736 
865 
286,3 
37,6 
24,5 
354 
407 
1986 
5864 
140791 
711 
635 
650 
776 
11,7 
12,3 
10,2 
4.689 
3.338 
742 
5.690 
904 
248,8 
35,0 
27,1 
326 
385 
1987 
5933 
6592 
142062 
450 
686 
622 
650 
794 
6,8 
10,8 
11,8 
10,0 
4.754 
3.396 
746 
5.864 
3,1 
921 
225,9 
32,9 
26,5 
322 
364 
1988 
5980 
6756 
143340 
433 
682 
609 
641 
814 
6,4 
10,3 
7,4 
9,5 
4.814 
3.457 
744 
6.032 
2,9 
1005 
132,3 
19,4 
27,8 
327 
355 
Sources  :  Centraal  Bureau  voor  de  Statistiek, Ministry  for  employment 
Centraal  Planbureau,  Eurostat 
1989* 
6030 
6833 
144200 
390 
660 
558 
620 
845 
5,7 
9,8 
6,9 
9,3 
4.896 
3.538 
743 
6.155 
2,0 
1020 
110,5 
16,7 
32,0 
318 
344 T
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 Table  6 
Savings  (1) 
Households  (2) 
Enterprises 
General  government 
Net  capital transfers 
total 
Households  (2) 
Enterprises 
General  government 
Gross  capital  formation 
total 
Enterprises 
General  government 
Borrowing  requirement 
total 
Households  (2) 
Enterprises 
General  government 
Balance  of current 
transactions 
(1)  Incl.  adjustment 
(2)' Incl.  Pension Funds 
-55-
Savings,  investment  and  net  borrowing  by  sector 
(as  % of  GOP) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
20,1  20,5  21,1  21,5  23,2  23,8  22,9  21,4  23,5 
8,1  8,9  11,2  9,8  9,4  9,1  9,5  8,9  9 
10,5  11,3  11,6  13,1  14,8  14,5  14,1  13,6  14,9 
1,5  0,2  -1,7  -1,4  -1  0,2  -0,7  -1,1  -0,4 
-0,3  -0,3  -0,3  -0,2  -0,2  -0,1  -0,3  -0,3  -0,3 
-7,6  -7,4  -8  -8,4  -8,2  -7,8  -7,8  -7,7  -7,6 
9,6  9,7  10,2  10,5  10,5  10  10,3  10,4  9,5 
-2,3  -2,6  -2,5  -2,3  -2,4  -2,3  -2,8  -3  -2,2 
21,5  18,3  17,9  18,4  19,1  19,8  19,7  19,6  20,8 
18,3  15,1  15,1  15,7  16,3  17,2  17,2  17,2  18,4 
3,3  3,1  2,9  2,7  2,8  2,6  2,5  2,4  2,4 
-1,7  1,9  2,8  2,9  4  4  2,4  1,1  2,1 
0,5  1,5  3,1  1,4  1,2  1,2  1,7  1,2  1,4 
1,8  5,8  6,8  7,9  9  7,4  7,2  6,8  6,1 
-4  -5,5  -7,1  -6,4  -6,3  -4,8  -6  -6,5  -5 
-1,5  2,2  3,2  3,1  4,2  4,1  2,7  1,4  2,4 
Source  Central  bureau of statistics,  National  Accounts,  transaction base. T
a
b
l
e
 
7
:
 
S
a
v
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
~
n
t
 
i
n
 
B
e
-
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
2
3
.
9
 
G
e
D
D
&
n
y
 
2
3
.
1
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
1
8
.
9
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
2
6
.
3
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
2
4
.
9
 
-
1
9
8
9
,
 
a
s
 
%
 
o
f
 
G
O
P
 
-
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
1
7
.
6
 
1
9
.
0
 
1
8
.
3
 
1
8
.
3
 
1
9
.
7
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
6
.
3
 
4
.
1
 
0
.
6
 
8
.
0
 
S
.
2
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
C
O
m
u
t
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
d
e
p
a
r
~
n
t
s
,
 
S
e
p
t
a
n
b
e
r
 
1
9
8
9
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
s
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
 
-
4
.
1
 
3
.
5
 
2
.
1
 
-
5
.
6
 
-
0
.
5
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
1
.
6
 
2
.
3
 
3
.
2
 
3
.
5
 
2
.
3
 
V
I
 
0
'
\
 T
a
b
l
e
 
8
:
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
D
u
t
c
h
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
(
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
)
 
2
6
 
1
 
1
9
9
0
 
~
~
~
~
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
O
U
N
T
i
l
Y
 
N
E
T
H
E
R
L
A
N
D
S
 
S
E
C
T
O
i
f
"
 
f
"
W
W
J
F
A
C
T
U
R
I
N
a
 
I
N
D
U
S
T
R
Y
 
S
I
Z
!
 
0
 
a
 
A
L
L
 
S
I
Z
E
S
 
R
A
T
I
O
S
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
~
-
-
~
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
 
B
O
R
R
O
W
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
I
 
O
W
N
 
R
E
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
 
X
 
4
7
.
4
7
 
4
8
.
6
8
 
4
9
.
9
9
 
4
8
.
4
5
 
4
2
.
4
7
 
3
9
.
6
3
 
3
8
.
7
6
 
4
0
.
7
5
 
2
 
L
O
N
G
 
T
E
R
r
1
 
R
E
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
 
I
 
I
N
V
E
S
T
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
X
 
9
8
.
7
6
 
9
8
.
8
0
 
9
9
.
0
3
 
1
0
2
.
0
6
 
1
0
2
.
7
3
 
1
0
5
.
1
8
 
1
0
4
.
1
1
 
1
0
2
.
3
2
 
3
 
C
U
R
R
E
N
T
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
I
 
S
H
O
R
T
 
T
E
R
t
1
 
D
E
B
T
 
X
 
1
4
3
.
4
7
 
1
4
2
.
7
2
 
1
4
0
.
6
1
 
1
4
4
.
1
4
 
1
4
4
.
4
5
 
1
4
3
.
9
0
 
1
4
6
.
0
7
 
1
4
5
.
2
9
 
4
 
L
I
Q
U
I
D
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
I
 
S
H
O
R
T
 
T
E
R
r
i
 
D
E
B
T
 
X
 
8
6
.
3
0
 
8
8
.
1
3
 
8
4
.
8
7
 
9
1
.
4
0
 
8
9
.
5
9
 
9
1
.
3
9
 
9
2
.
6
3
 
9
4
.
2
2
 
5
 
L
O
N
&
 
T
E
R
f
'
t
 
D
E
B
T
 
I
 
S
E
L
F
 
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
N
Q
 
C
A
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
Y
E
A
R
S
 
3
.
0
 
3
.
1
 
3
.
1
 
2
.
4
 
1
.
7
 
1
.
8
 
1
.
7
 
1
.
6
 
6
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
N
G
 
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
 
I
 
I
N
V
E
S
T
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
X
 
1
0
.
5
1
 
1
0
.
6
8
 
1
0
.
6
1
 
1
2
.
9
2
 
1
4
.
9
4
 
1
5
.
4
9
 
1
5
.
5
9
 
1
5
.
4
9
 
7
 
N
E
T
 
P
R
O
F
I
T
 
A
F
T
E
R
 
T
A
X
E
S
 
I
 
E
Q
U
I
T
Y
 
X
 
4
.
1
6
 
5
.
3
3
 
5
.
0
6
 
7
.
9
8
 
1
2
.
4
1
 
1
0
.
5
7
 
1
1
.
0
1
 
1
2
.
3
9
 
8
 
V
A
L
U
E
 
A
D
D
E
D
 
I
 
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
I
O
N
 
X
 
2
5
.
9
6
 
2
4
.
8
3
 
2
4
.
6
0
 
2
5
.
6
5
 
2
4
.
2
4
 
2
3
.
9
1
 
2
6
.
1
8
 
2
8
.
4
3
 
9
 
L
A
S
O
U
R
 
C
O
S
T
S
 
I
 
V
A
L
U
E
 
A
D
D
E
D
 
X
 
7
6
.
7
8
 
7
!
.
7
2
 
7
6
.
6
8
 
7
2
.
1
9
 
6
7
.
0
5
 
6
6
.
9
3
 
6
6
.
4
7
 
6
5
.
8
3
 
1
0
 
G
R
O
S
S
 
O
P
E
R
A
 
T
I
N
S
 
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
 
I
 
N
E
T
 
T
U
R
N
O
V
E
R
 
X
 
6
.
0
4
 
6
.
0
4
 
5
.
7
5
 
7
.
1
6
 
8
.
0
1
 
7
.
9
4
 
8
.
8
2
 
9
.
7
7
 
1
1
 
t
-
l
l
R
K
I
N
G
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
R
!
Q
U
I
R
e
'
E
H
T
S
 
I
 
N
E
T
 
T
U
R
N
O
V
E
R
 
D
A
Y
S
 
4
6
 
4
4
 
4
2
 
4
0
 
3
8
 
3
5
 
3
8
 
4
2
 
1
2
 
S
E
L
F
 
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
N
G
 
C
A
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
I
 
V
A
L
U
E
 
A
D
D
E
D
 
X
 
1
9
.
1
0
 
1
9
.
8
5
 
1
9
.
2
3
 
2
4
.
6
1
 
3
1
.
8
1
 
2
9
.
0
6
 
3
0
.
3
2
 
3
3
.
6
7
 
1
3
 
N
E
T
 
T
U
R
N
O
V
E
R
 
I
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
"
 
1
1
8
.
7
2
 
1
2
0
.
5
7
 
1
2
3
.
6
4
 
1
1
8
.
5
1
 
1
2
1
.
8
3
 
1
2
2
.
2
2
 
1
1
5
.
1
5
 
1
0
6
.
8
9
 
.
 
1
4
 
I
N
T
E
R
E
S
T
 
C
H
A
R
G
E
S
 
I
 
B
O
R
R
O
W
E
D
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
"
 
1
0
.
9
7
 
1
1
.
6
2
 
1
1
.
6
5
 
1
0
.
1
4
 
1
0
.
4
3
 
1
0
.
0
3
 
9
.
5
4
 
8
.
1
9
 
I
 
I
 
1
5
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
I
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
F
I
X
E
D
 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 
"
 
4
5
.
6
0
 
4
6
.
4
5
 
4
4
.
6
6
 
4
4
.
7
2
 
4
7
.
2
6
 
4
4
.
0
6
 
4
2
.
1
8
 
4
2
.
0
0
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
B
A
C
H
 
C
 
E
u
r
o
p
u
n
 
C
O
I
I
I
I
i
 
s
s
i
o
n
:
 
D
G
 
2
)
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
s
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
(
1
,
2
0
0
 
f
i
r
m
s
)
 
V
l
 
-
.
.
.
.
:
1
 
I
 1
.
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
o
n
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
1
 
o
n
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
2
.
 
T
r
a
c
t
.
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
.
 
O
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
:
 
.
,
.
,
-
g
y
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
3
.
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
.
s
 
4
.
 
F
a
c
t
o
r
 
i
~
 
5
.
 
T
r
a
n
s
f
•
r
s
 
6
.
 
C
u
r
r
t
a
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
c
a
s
h
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
7
.
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
o
v
e
m
.
n
t
s
 
a
.
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
•
r
s
 
9
.
 
L
o
n
g
-
t
•
r
m
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
,
 
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
;
 
n
g
 
p
r
i
 
v
a
t
•
 
s
.
c
t
o
r
 
1
0
.
 
S
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
,
 
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
 
1
 
n
g
 
p
r
i
 
v
a
t
•
 
s
.
c
t
o
r
 
1
1
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
.
c
t
o
r
 
1
2
.
 
O
t
h
a
r
s
 
1
3
.
 
N
o
n
-
m
o
n
.
t
a
r
y
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
4
.
 
B
a
n
k
 
1
 
n
g
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
1
5
.
 
C
h
a
~
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
r
•
s
.
r
v
•
s
 
(
1
)
 
C
1
)
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
•
 
C
+
>
 
S
o
u
r
c
•
 
:
 
0
.
 
N
-
-
.
.
l
a
n
d
s
c
t
.
.
 
B
a
n
k
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
9
A
:
 
B
A
I
.
k
"
\
T
C
E
 
O
F
 
P
A
Y
M
E
N
T
S
 
(
 
i
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
H
F
L
 
)
 
8
2
 
8
3
 
8
5
 
1
1
6
3
2
 
1
1
8
1
2
 
1
6
7
3
9
 
1
7
2
3
0
 
1
2
2
5
8
 
1
1
8
8
6
 
1
8
0
2
5
 
1
8
1
2
8
 
-
2
8
9
7
 
-
2
9
5
1
 
-
2
8
1
5
 
6
7
0
 
2
6
6
2
 
1
7
5
1
 
2
1
4
5
 
1
3
5
9
 
-
3
1
0
 
5
2
3
 
-
4
~
 
6
7
8
 
-
2
9
7
8
 
-
2
3
4
8
 
-
2
9
3
6
 
-
2
9
3
5
 
1
0
4
7
9
 
7
8
4
4
 
1
3
2
4
5
 
1
4
2
1
1
 
-
9
6
6
6
 
-
5
2
1
0
 
-
1
2
5
2
0
 
-
1
2
5
2
2
 
-
9
1
3
 
-
4
7
4
 
-
3
1
4
 
-
2
1
1
 
-
6
6
9
0
 
-
3
9
4
2
 
-
9
9
3
9
 
-
9
6
6
6
 
-
2
3
5
9
 
-
8
0
5
 
-
1
8
4
0
 
-
2
7
6
2
 
2
9
6
 
1
1
 
-
4
2
8
 
1
1
8
 
-
3
6
9
 
5
4
0
 
1
0
3
7
 
4
1
0
 
4
4
3
 
3
1
7
5
 
1
7
6
2
 
2
0
9
8
 
4
3
1
0
 
-
3
6
9
0
 
-
1
8
2
8
 
-
1
4
 
4
7
5
4
 
-
5
1
5
 
-
6
7
 
2
0
8
5
 
8
6
 
8
7
 
8
8
 
8
9
 
1
1
6
3
3
 
6
5
4
2
 
1
0
6
6
8
 
1
7
9
1
8
 
1
0
5
9
3
 
1
5
9
0
8
 
6
1
7
0
 
-
2
3
7
 
-
1
5
6
2
 
-
1
6
4
8
 
3
2
2
 
-
1
0
8
9
 
-
9
8
6
 
-
5
7
9
 
-
1
8
8
8
 
-
3
6
5
2
 
-
3
7
9
3
 
-
2
2
6
3
 
8
7
5
9
 
4
0
0
9
 
5
0
0
1
 
1
1
0
6
7
 
-
2
1
8
8
7
 
-
4
5
6
8
 
3
7
 
1
3
8
2
2
 
-
5
2
3
 
-
5
8
2
 
-
4
5
9
 
-
8
0
7
 
V
l
 
-
1
5
7
2
0
 
-
1
1
9
1
 
6
7
7
4
 
1
5
3
6
5
 
0
0
 
-
4
4
7
9
 
-
2
3
4
5
 
-
4
0
0
1
 
-
6
8
 
-
1
1
6
5
 
-
4
4
9
 
-
2
2
7
7
 
-
6
6
9
 
-
2
9
2
8
 
1
2
1
1
 
-
1
0
7
3
 
-
3
0
3
1
 
-
1
6
0
5
6
 
6
5
2
 
3
9
6
4
 
2
1
8
5
8
 
1
5
0
5
6
 
5
2
0
9
 
-
7
3
9
 
-
2
0
8
5
0
 
-
9
9
9
 
5
8
6
1
 
3
2
2
5
 
1
0
0
8
 1
.
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
o
n
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
2
.
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
t
M
!
l
a
n
c
.
 
O
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
:
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
3
.
 
S
.
t
"
Y
i
c
.
s
 
4
.
 
F
a
c
t
o
r
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
s
.
 
T
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
6
.
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
c
a
s
h
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
7
.
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
8
.
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
9
.
 
L
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
,
 
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
1
0
.
 
S
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
,
 
N
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
1
1
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
1
2
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
1
3
.
 
N
o
n
-
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
4
.
 
B
a
n
k
 
1
 
n
g
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
1
5
.
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
s
 
(
1
)
 
(
1
)
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
•
 
(
+
)
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
:
 
D
e
 
N
a
d
e
r
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
n
.
 
B
a
n
k
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
9
8
:
 
B
A
L
A
J
.
"
i
C
E
 
O
F
 
P
A
Y
M
L
'
V
T
S
 
(
a
s
 
0
/
o
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
)
 
8
2
 
8
3
 
8
4
 
8
5
 
3
.
2
 
3
.
1
 
4
.
2
 
4
.
1
 
3
.
3
 
3
.
1
 
4
.
5
 
4
.
3
 
-
.
a
 
-
.
a
 
-
.
7
 
.
2
 
.
7
 
.
5
 
.
5
 
.
3
 
-
.
1
 
.
1
 
-
.
1
 
.
2
 
-
.
a
 
-
.
6
 
-
.
7
 
-
.
7
 
2
.
8
 
2
.
1
 
3
.
3
 
3
.
4
 
-
2
.
6
 
-
1
.
4
 
-
3
.
1
 
-
3
.
0
 
-
.
2
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
1
 
-
1
.
a
 
-
1
.
0
 
-
2
.
5
 
-
2
.
3
 
-
.
6
 
-
.
2
 
-
.
5
 
-
.
7
 
.
1
 
.
o
 
-
.
1
 
.
o
 
-
.
1
 
.
1
 
.
3
 
.
1
 
.
1
 
.
8
 
.
4
 
.
s
 
1
.
2
 
-
1
.
0
 
-
.
5
 
.
o
 
1
.
3
 
-
.
1
 
.
o
 
.
5
 
8
6
 
8
7
 
8
8
 
a
9
 
2
.
7
 
1
.
5
 
2
.
4
 
4
.
2
 
2
.
5
 
3
.
5
 
1
.
4
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
3
 
-
.
4
 
.
1
 
-
.
2
 
-
.
2
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
4
 
-
.
9
 
-
.
9
 
-
.
5
 
2
.
0
 
.
9
 
1
.
1
 
2
.
3
 
-
5
.
1
 
-
1
.
1
 
.
o
 
2
.
9
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
2
 
V
l
 
-
3
.
7
 
-
.
3
 
1
.
5
 
3
.
2
 
"
"
 
-
1
.
0
 
-
.
5
 
-
.
9
 
.
o
 
-
.
3
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
5
 
-
.
1
 
-
.
1
 
.
3
 
-
.
2
 
-
.
6
 
-
3
.
7
 
.
2
 
.
9
 
4
.
6
 
3
.
5
 
1
.
2
 
-
.
2
 
-
4
.
4
 
-
.
2
 
1
.
4
 
.
7
 
.
2
 -60-
Table  10  Merchandise  trade  by  SITC  sections  (as  % of  total) 
IMPORTS 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
TOTAL 
0.  Foods  and  live  11,2  11,6  11,8  11,7  11,2  11,1  11,7  11,8  12,7 
animals 
1.  Beverage,  tobacco  1,4  1,3  1,4  1,4  1,3  1,2  1,4  1,4  1,2 
2.  Crude  materials,  6,3  6,2  5,9  5,9  6,0  6,0  5,7  5,5  6,0 
excl.  fuels 
3.  Mineral  fuels,  24,1  i6,5  26,0  25,0  24,2  23,3  13,0  12,1  9,7 
lubricants 
5.  Chemicals  8,2  8,6  8,6  8,9  9,5  10,1  10,5  10,7  11,0 
6.  Manufactured  goods  15,9  14,4  14,4  14,0  14,4  14,4  16,7  16,4  17,3 
7.  Machinery  and  19,8  18,8  19,3  21,1  21,3  22,2  27,4  27,9  28,2 
transport  equipment 
8.  Other manufactures  11,0  10,5  10,2  10,2  9,7  9,8  12,1  12,8  12,8 
9.  Other  non  classified  1,3  1,3  1,5  1,0  0,9  0,8  0,7  1,0  0,5 
EXPORTS 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
TOTAL 
o.  Foods  and  live  17,1  18,3  18,2  17,6  16,9  16,1  17,4  18,2  18,1 
animals 
1.  Beverage,  tobacco  1,6  1,6  1,7  1,7  1,7  1,6  2,0  2,1  1,9 
2.  Crude  materials,  5,2  4,7  4,7  4,7  4,8  ·5,1  5,7  6,0  6,5 
excl.  fuels 
3.  Mineral  fuels,  22,2  24,0  23,9  23,6  23,3  24,0  15,8  11,5  8,7 
lubricants 
5.  Chemicals  15,1  14,7  14,6  15,2  15,2  14,8  15,4  16,3  16,8 
6.  Manufactured  goods  13,5  12,6  12,4  12,2  12,3  12,2  13,6  13,9  14,3 
7.  Machinery  and  16,9  15,8  16,0  16,2  16,0  16,2  19,2  20,5  21,5 
transport  equipment 
8.  Other manufactures  6,0  5,6  5,8  6,0  5,9  6,2  7,3  7,9  8,0 
9.  Other  non  classified  1,4  1,7  1,7  1,8  2,4  2,4  2,8  2,9  3,5 T
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TAJU  .. E  ll : I>IRI~CT INVESTI\·IENT 1'1..0\VS 
85  86  87  88  89 
DUTCH  INVESTMENT  ABROAD 
(distribution as  X of total> 
Eur-12'  46.3  56.5  37.6  19.2  55.1 
Of  which  :  BLEU  3.3  3.9  .7  18.7  16.0 
Germany  4.5  -4.7  -2.1  12.2  6.0 
France  4.1  4.2  1.0  9.0  6.9 
Italy  .6  2.3  1.0  -7.0  1.2 
Unfted-K  i ngdom  31.1  41.8  36.5  -22.8  3.1 
u.s.A.  29.9  15.3  45.1  43.1  29.6 
.Japan  1.6  -.4  .7  .4  .3 
Switzerland  1.5  5.3  3.1  14.8  2.1 
Developing countries  19.7  9.9  3.0  20.0  5.0 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100 
As  X of GOP  2.8  1.  9  3.4  1.6  4.4 
As  X of  GFCF  14.4  9.6  16.8  7.4  20.3 
FOREIGN  INVESTMENT  IN  THE  NETHERLANDS 
(distribution as X of total) 
Eur-12  45.3  62.7  52.6  70.4  57.9 
Of  which  :  BLEU  -7.1  -2.6  10.6  22.0  30.4 
Germany  19.6  17.8  6.2  -.8  7.2 
France  1.9  -2.5  1.  0  2.7  1.9 
Italy  .8  .0  -3.5  .5  .0 
United-Kingdom  30.4  50.0  37.7  40.5  15.5 
U.S.A.  -44.7  -17.2  11.8  -1.8  13.7 
Japan  2.9  2.2  2.2  7.1  2.4 
Switzerland  35.4  15.5  10.8  4.8  14.1 
Developing countries  56.9  36.4  22.2  13.2  3.5 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100 
As  X of GOP  .5  1.4  l.  2  1.7  2.7 
As  X of GFCF  2.5  6.9  6.1  8.0  12.4 
BALANCE  AS  X OF  GOP 
Eur-12  -1.1  -.2  -.6  .9  -.9 
Of  whfch  :  BLEU  -.1  -.1  .1  .1  .1 
Germany  .o  .3  .1  -.2  -.1 
Franc•  -.1  -.1  .o  -.1  -.3 
Italy  .0  .0  -.1  .1  -.1 
United-Kingdom  -.7  -.1  ·-.8  1. 1  .3 
U.S.A.  -1.0  -.5  -1.4  -.7  -.9 
Japan  .0  .o  .o  • 1  .1 
Switzerland  • 1  .1  .o  -.2  .3 
Developing countries  -.3  .3  .2  -.1  -.1 
TOTAL  -2.3  -.6  -2.2  .1  -1.7 
As  X of GFCF  -11.8  -2.8  -10.7  .6  -7.8 
Source  :  Da  Nader' landsche Bank -63-
TABLEAU  13A 
II/0/3 - 3/ 4/1990 
RELATIVE  CYCLICAL  POSITION,  RELATIVE  PRICES  AND  COSTS  OF  NETHERLANDS 
VIS  A VIS  Et1S  PARTNERS 
------------------------------------------------------~---------~-------------------------- . I  INDEX  OF  EFFECTIVE I  RELATIVE  GOP  RELATIVE  UNIT  RELATIVE  I 
I  I  RELATIVE  EXCHANGE  I  PRICES  I  LABOR  COSTS  I  WAGE  I 
I YEAR  I  CYCLE  RATE  1-----------------------------------------------l  SHARE  I 
I  I  I  I  NATIONAL  I  coti"'N  I  NATIONAL  I  eotti)N  I  I 
I  I  I  I  CURRENCY  I  CURRENCY  I  CURRENCY  I  CURRENCY  I  I 
------------------------------------------1-----------------------l----------------------- INDEX  1970  = 100 
1970  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1971  99.0  100.6  100.8  101.4  100.7  101.3  99.9 
1972  95.8  100.7  103.8  104.5  102.7  103.4  98.9 
1973  95.1  101.2  104.7  105.9  104.2  105.5  99.5 
1974  96.7  106.7  103.2  110.1  102.6  109.4  99.4 
1975  97.6  107.2  103.3  110.8  102.5  109.9  99.2 
1976  97.3  uo.  7  104.1  115.2  101.2  112.0  97.2 
1977  99.0  115.6  103.0  ll9.0  99.8  U5.4  96.9 
1978  100.3  117.4  101.1  118.7  98.7  ll!S.8  97.6 
1979  97.0  117.7  97.9  11!5. 3  96.9  114.1  99.0 
1980  95.0  119.1  95.5  113.7  93.0  110.8  97.4 
1981  92.8  120.4  93.2  112.2  87.8  105.7  94.2 
1982  91.5  128.4  91.2  117.1  85.8  110.2  94.1 
1983  93.0  132.4  87.0  115.1  81.4  107.7  93.6 
1984  92.8  133.1  84.2  112.0  76.3  101.5  90.6 
1985  94.2  133.7  81.9  109.6  73.9  98.9  90.2 
1986  92.3  137.2  78.8  108.0  72.7  99.8  92.3 
1987  91.3  140.3  76.1  106.8  71.9  100.9  94.5 
1988  89.8  141.4  75.5  106.7  71.0  100.3  94.0 
1989  90.1  140.6  73.7  103.6  68.6  96.4  93.1 
1990  90.4  141.2  72.8  102.8  68.1  96.1  93.5 
1991  90.3  141.3  72.1  101.8  67.5  95.3  93.6 
- - - - - ----- ----- - - - - - ------- - - - -
•I• CHANGE  P.A. 
1971  - 1.0  .6  .8  1.4  .7  1.3  I  - • 1 
1972  - 3.2  .1  3.0  3.1  2.0  2.1  I  - 1.0 
1973  - .7  .5  .9  1.3  1.  !5  2.0  I  .6 
1974  1.  7  5.4  - 1.4  4.0  - 1.5  3.7  I  - .1 
I 
1975  .9  .5  .1  .6  - .1  .5  t  - .2 
1976  - .3  3.3  .8  4.0  - 1.3  1.9  - 2.0 
1977  1.7  4.4  - 1.1  3.3  - 1.4  3.0  - .3 
1978  1.3  1.6  - 1.8  - .3  - 1.1  .3  .7 
1979  - 3.3  .3  - 3.2  - 2.9  - 1.8  - 1.5  1.4 
1980  - 2.1  1.2  - 2.5  - 1.4  - 4.0  - 2.9  - 1.6 
1981  - 2.3  1.1  - 2.4  - 1.3  - 5.6  - 4.6  - 3.3 
1982  - 1.4  6.6  - 2.1  4.4  - 2.3  4.3  - .1 
1983  1.6  3.1  - 4.6  - 1.  7  - 5.1  - 2.3  - .5 
1984  - .2  .5  - 3.2  - 2.7  - 6.3  - 5.8  - 3.2 
1985  1.5  .5  - 2.7  - 2.1  - 3.1  - 2.6  - .4 
1986  - 2.0  2.6  - 3.8  - 1.!5  - 1.6  .9  2.3 
1987  - 1.1  2.3  - 3.4  - 1.1  - 1.1  1.1  2.4 
1988  - 1.6  .8  - .8  - .1  - 1.3  - ·'  - .5 
1989  .3  - .6  - 2.4  - 2.9  - 3.4  - 3.9  - 1.0 
1990  .3  .4  - 1.2  - .8  - .7  - .3  .4 
1991  - .1  .1  - 1.0  - 1.0  - .9  - .8  .1 
------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------------64-
TABLEAU  1-38  : 
II/D/3 - 3/ 4/!990 
RELATIVE  CYCLICAL  POSITION,  RELATIVE  PRICES  AND  COSTS  OF  NETHERLANDS 
VIS  A VIS  IC19  PARTNERS 
I  INDEX  OF  EFFECTIVE!  RELATIVE  GOP  RELATIVE  UNIT  I  RELATIVE 
I  I  RELATIVE  EXCHANGE  I  PRICES  I  LABOR  COSTS  I  WAGE 
IYEAR  I  CYCLE  RATE  1-----------------------------------------------l  SHARE 
I  I  NATIONAL  I  Cott10N  I  NATIONAL  I  COtt10N  I 
I  I  I  CURRENCY  I  CURRENCY  I  CURRENCY  I  CURRENCY  I  I 
I 
-----------------------------------------1-----------------------I------------------------
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
100.0 
99.1 
95.9 
95.1 
96.7 
96.9 
97.6 
99.8 
101.9 
91.9 
95.9 
94.0 
91.9 
92.8 
91.3 
92.0 
90.2 
89.0 
87.0 
87.3 
88.0 
88.0 
.9 
- 3.2 
.8. 
1.7 
.2 
.7 
2.3 
2.1 
- 3.9 
- z.o 
- 2.0 
- 2.2 
1.0 
- 1.6 
.8 
- 2.0 
- 1.3 
- 2.2 
.3 
.8 
.o 
100.0 
101.0 
102.4 
105.7 
111.2 
113.9 
117.0 
123.2 
126.1 
127.9 
128.2 
122.7 
128.9 
131.6 
129.5 
129.8 
139.8 
146.9 
146.3 
144.8 
150.4 
150.5 
1.0 
1.4 
3.2 
5.2 
2.4 
2.7 
5.3 
2.4 
1.4 
.2 
- 4.3 
5.1 
2.1 
- 1.~ 
.2 
7.7 
5.1 
.4 
- 1.0 
3.9 
• 1 
INDEX  1970 = 100  I 
100.0 
101.0 
103.9 
104.8 
102.8 
101.6 
102.1 
100.8 
99.0 
95.4 
92.3 
89.8 
88.2 
84.8 
82.3 
80.2 
77.4 
74.6 
73.5 
71.4 
70.3 
69.4 
100.0 
102.0 
106.4 
110.8 
114.3 
115.7 
119.4 
124.2 
124.8 
122.0 
118.3 
110.1 
113.8 
111.5 
106.6 
104.2 
108.2 
109.6 
107.5 
103.4 
105.8 
104.'• 
•I• CfANGE  P.A. 
1.0 
2.9 
.9 
- 1.9 
- 1.2 
.5 
- 1.3 
- 1.8 
- 3.6 
- 3.2 
- 2.7 
- 1.8 
- 3.9 
- 2.9 
- 2.6 
- 3.5 
- 3.6 
- 1.5 
- 2.9 
- 1.5 
- 1.  3 
2.0 
4.3 
4.1 
3.2 
1.2 
3.2 
4.0 
.5 
- 2.2 
- 3.0 
- 6.9 
3.4 
- 2.0 
- 4.4 
- 2.3 
3.8 
1.3 
- 1.9 
- 3.8 
2.3 
- 1.3 
100.0 
101.4 
103.2 
104.9 
102.4 
101.2 
99.3 
98.2 
97.0 
94.9 
90.6 
85.5 
83.6 
79.9 
74.9 
72.5 
71.2 
70.3 
68.7 
65.5 
64.3 
63.3 
1.4 
1.8 
1.6 
- 2.4 
- 1.2 
- 1.9 
- 1.1 
- 1.2 
- 2.2 
- 4.5 
- 5.6 
- 2.2  ..  ,._4 
- 6.3 
- 3.2 
- 1.8 
- 1. 3 
- 2.3 
- 4.7 
- 1.8 
- 1.6 
100.0 
102.3 
105.6 
110.8 
113.9 
115.2 
116.2 
121.0 
122.4 
121.4 
116.2 
104.9 
107.8 
105.1 
97.0 
9'-t-2 
99.5 
103.2 
100.4 
94.9 
96.7 
95.3 
2.3 
3.2 
4.9 
2.8 
1.1 
.9 
4.1 
1.2 
.8 
- 4.3 
- 9.7 
2.8 
- 2.5 
- 1.7 
- 2.9 
5.6 
3.7 
- 2.7 
- 5.5 
1.9 
- 1 -'• 
100.0 
100.4 
99.3 
100.1 
99.6 
99.6 
97.3 
97.4 
98.0 
99.5 
98.2 
95.2 
94.8 
9'•· 2 
91.0 
90.4 
92.0 
94.2 
93.5 
91.7 
91.5 
91.2 
.4 
- 1.1 
.8 
.5 
.o 
- 2.3 
.1 
.6 
1.5 
- 1. 3 
- 3.1 
.4 
.6 
- 3.4 
.7 
1.8 
2.4 
.7 
- 1.9 
.2 
.3 
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TABLEAU J9A: SIIORT-TERM INTEREST RATES 
(monthly) 
NL  I 
D  J 
USA  I 
DIFF  NL  - D 
8701  5.71  4.49  5.~"•3  1.22 
8702  5.ct2  3.97  5.59  1.ct5 
8703  5.!55  3.99  5.59  1.56 
8704  5.43  3.89  5.53  1.5ct 
8705  !5.23  3.76  6.03  1.47 
8706  !5.27  3.70  !5.82  1.57 
8707  5.33  3.83  5.78  1.50 
8708  5.36  3.95  6.00  1.41 
8709  5.ctt  3.99  6.53  1.42 
8710  5.79  ct.70  6.32  1.09 
8711  5.11  3.94  5.81  1.17 
8712  ct.7!5  3.65  !5.98  1.10 
8801  4.36  3.cto  5.98  .96 
8802  ct.U  3.32  5.87  .79 
8803  4.08  3.39  5.86  .69 
880ct  ct.07  3.39  6.09  .68 
8805  4.19  3.49  6.47  .70 
8806  4.20  3.89  6.67  .31 
8807  4.97  4.90  6.93  .07 
8808  5.62  5.32  7.30  .30 
8809  5.63  4.96  7.47  .67 
8810  5.'+7  5.00  7.58  .47 
8811  5.40  4.90  8.04  .50 
8812  5.70  5.33  8.34  .37 
8901  6.10  5.65  8.55  .45 
8902  6.86  6.39  8.83  .47 
8903  6.98  6.62  9.15  .36 
8904  6.80  6.'+3  8.98  .37 
8905  7.'+1  6.98  8.73  .43 
8906  7.22  6.96  8.4'+  .26 
8907  7.19  7.0'+  8.15  .15 
8908  7.2!5  7.02  8.17  .23 
8909  7.63  7.36  8.01  .27 
8910  8.17  8.08  7.88  .09 
8911  8.47  8.23  7.94  .24 
8912  8.57  8.05  7.88  .52 
9001  8.92  8.25  7.88  .67 
9002  9.01  8.26  8.00  .75 
9003  8.76  8.37  8.16  .39 
INTEREST  RATE  DEFINITIONS. 
tl..,  D :  3-month  i nt•l"'bank  rat••. 
USA  :  yield on  3-month Tr•••ury bills. T
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TABLE  21 
THE  AMSTERDAM  STOCK  EXCHANGE  IN  1988 
A.  The  principal market 
Shares  Bonds 
Securities quoted  453  1311 
domestic  226  1146 
(public)  (-)  (253) 
(private)  (-)  (893) 
foreign  227  165 
(public)  (-)  (140) 
(private)  (-)  (25) 
Capitalization  (a)  of domestic 
securities 
HFL  bn  227,40  229,25 
(public)  (-)  (165,45) 
(private)  (-)  (63,80) 
% GNP  50,8  51,0 
% Eur  12  7,1  5,7 
Turnover 
HFL  bn  120,32  206,73 
("internationals")  (b)  (47,01)  (-) 
(domestic)  (72,63)  (-) 
(foreign)  (0,68)  (-) 
(a)  Par  value  in case of bonds 
(b)  Philips,  Royal  Dutch,  Shell,  Akzo,  Uni1ever 
B.  The  parallel market  in  1988 
Shares  quoted  60 
domestic  3 
foreign  57 
Capitalization of domestic  shares 
HFL  bn  2,8 
Share  turnover 
HFL  bn  1,0 
% of capitalization  35,7 
Source  Committee of Stock  Exchanges  in  the  EEC 
Source  :  De  Nederlandsche  Bank '
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